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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters.
The first chapter, “The Supply-Side Effects of India’s Demonetization”, inves-
tigates the supply-side effects of a unique monetary shock – the 2016 Indian
demonetization – that made 86% of currency in circulation illegal overnight. Ex-
ploiting cross-sectional variation in firm and industry characteristics that cor-
relate with cash usage and exposure to the informal sector, I find that firms
that use cash more and obtain larger shares of labor or material inputs from
the informal sector, experienced declines in their labor and material shares af-
ter demonetization. I also show that casual laborers were more likely to report
being unemployed in the months following demonetization. These findings
document a supply channel for demonetization and also show that cash plays
an essential role in India’s informal sector. Crucially, given that India’s formal
sector is highly dependent on the informal sector for labor and materials, any
shock to the supply of cash is likely to have affected the economy as a whole.
In the second chapter, “Directed Lending and Misallocation: Evidence from
India”, joint with Deeksha Kale, we leverage a natural experiment to study
whether targeted credit policy can help reduce misallocation. In 2006, the Gov-
ernment of India modified the definition of small firms thereby expanding el-
igibility to a directed credit program. We show that the credit policy changed
eligible firms’ input wedges and thereby reduced misallocation. For firms with
initially higherMRPK, the policy resulted in relatively larger increases in phys-
ical capital and decreased the MRPK. This policy moderately reduced within-
industry dispersion of MRPK and increased aggregate productivity.
Finally, in the third chapter, “Victims of Consequence: Evidence on Child Out-
comes using Microdata from a Civil War”, joint with Sajala Pandey, we study the
short-run impacts of violent events on child time allocation, curative health-
care, and education. Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in exposure to
local-level armed conflict, we find that an increase in violent events: (i) leads
to an increase in contemporaneous hours worked by children, with the effect
being substantial for agricultural work; (ii) decreases the likelihood of parents
taking their children to visit a health-care facility to seek curative care; and
(iii) results in a reduced likelihood of attending school, along with a decline in
years of education. Overall, the results indicate that the war affected school-
ing and time allocation of boys whereas girls were less likely to get curative
health-care.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SUPPLY-SIDE EFFECTS OF INDIA’S DEMONETIZA-
TION
1.1 Introduction
Paper currency is still widely used in both, developed and developing coun-
tries alike. Despite repeated calls for moving away from cash (Rogoff, 2015)
and having made tremendous technological advances in payment technolo-
gies, cash facilitates easy exchange by overcoming financial barriers such as
access to banking services. Businesses, even, may hold cash for precautionary
motives or transactional purposes in order to pay for certain inputs that are
easier to pay for in cash. The latter function of cash is reminiscent of countries
with a large informal or unorganized production sector1 where the formal and
informal sector are interdependent. Firms rely on informal employment2 by
hiring temporary workers, usually without a formal contract, involve them in
casual yet full-time labor, and typically pay these workers their wages in cash
because they do not have or use bank accounts. In such environments, cash
plays an essential role in overcoming the transactional friction.
In this chapter, I study the importance of cash to firms in India by exploit-
ing industry reliance on cash and, exposure to informal employment and the
informal sector. In order to do this, I analyze a unique unanticipated shock
1The “informal sector” or “unorganized sector” comprises of firms that are not registered.
The exact definition varies from country to country.
2Informal employment is a job-based concept and is defined in terms of the employer-
employee contractual relationship and basic protections that are included with the job of the
worker (ILO, 2018). Typically, these “casual” workers get their wages in cash, work without a
formal contract, and are not covered by regulatory protections (RBI, 2017).
1
to the supply of existing currency in circulation. On November 8th, 2016, the
Government of India announced that the two largest denomination currency
notes would cease to be legal tender. This was termed as demonetization and
the policy amounted to rendering 86% of currency-in-circulation illegal ten-
der overnight. Due to additional constraints on printing and distributing new
notes to replace the demonetized currency, the policy resulted in a large and
abrupt decline in the supply of cash (see Figure 1.B.1) in the months that fol-
lowed. I exploit the unanticipated nature of the episode as a natural exper-
iment to test whether firms in industries that were more reliant on informal
employment andmore exposed to the informal sector for material inputs, were
disproportionately affected by the shock. Unable to pay informal workers their
wages andmaterials suppliers the cost of goods in cash, these firmswere forced
to lay off part of their work force and procure fewer materials, respectively, in
the period immediately after the demonetization announcement.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I construct measures of cash usage,
reliance on informal employment, and exposure to the informal sector, using
a survey of workers, a census of manufacturing, and a survey of informal en-
terprises. It is key that these measures are taken from data prior to the demon-
etization episode so that I can identify from the cross-section of industries. I
then merge these to a database of quarterly financial statements of firms and
estimate the near-term effect of the demonetization shock using a difference-in-
differences approach. The sudden and unanticipated nature of the announce-
ment renders itself useful for and provides credence to the identification strat-
egy. Additionally, cross-sectional heterogeneity in industry and firm exposure
to informality helps unpack the causal effects of the shock by naturally produc-
ing firms that were treated with different intensity. Second, I use a household
panel to verify whether casual-type workers were more likely to report being
2
unemployed in the months after demonetization relative to formal-type work-
ers.
I find threemain results. First, I find that firms in industries characterized by
greater cash usage hired fewer workers and purchased fewer materials follow-
ing the demonetization shock. I show this by documenting a relative decline
in firms’ labor share and materials share in value added for industries with
greater cash usage in the quarters during and after the sudden announcement.
Firms that hire more informal workers and inputs from the informal sector
need to hold more cash. Hence, I measure cash usage in two ways: one, the
industry share of cash in current assets, and two, the industry share of cash
in total spending on labor and materials. A one standard deviation increase
in cash usage, by either measure, translates to a 1.5 percentage point decline
in labor share, and a 1.6 percentage point decline in materials share in value
added.
Second, I construct measures of industry dependence on informal employ-
ment and a measure of exposure to the informal sector for materials. For labor
I measure informal employment by the fraction of informal workers in total
workforce in an industry, and the fraction of casual-type payments made to
workers in an industry. I find that a one standard deviation increase in infor-
mal employment, by either measure, is associated with a 0.5 percentage point
decline in labor share in value added. Formaterials, I first construct a firm-level
measure of exposure to the informal sector. This measure uses product-level
purchase value of materials by firms and the extent of informality at the re-
spective product-mapped industry using value added by informal enterprises
vis-à-vis that of total (formal and informal) enterprises. I find that firms that
are more exposed to the informal sector by this measure experienced a signifi-
cant decline in their materials share in value added in the quarter immediately
3
after demonetization.
Third, using a household panel I show that casual or temporary laborers
(such as, wage laborers, hawkers, support staff etc.), relative to salaried work-
ers in formal employment (such as, businessmen, organized farmers, industrial
workers, white collar clerical employees etc.) were more likely to report be-
coming unemployed in the months after demonetization. These worker-level
findings thus verify my findings from the firm-level analysis that document a
decline in the labor share.
My findings highlight that there were significant supply-side effects caused
by the large and unanticipated contraction in currency in circulation. Cash
plays an essential role in India’s informal sector and given that India’s formal
sector is highly dependent on the informal sector, a large shock to the sup-
ply of cash is likely to have affected the economy as a whole. The identifica-
tion strategy based on the cross-section of industry dependence and exposure
to informally-sourced inputs is limited in documenting near term impacts of
the episode. My results also indicate that these negative effects are relatively
smaller even dissipate in the quarter after the demonetization announcement.
Given that available data exclude the informal sector, which was presumably
most hurt by the shock, my findings are a conservative lower bound of the total
effects.
Aggregate data do not describe the true effects of demonetization for two
reasons. One, output from the informal sector is not measured but estimated
as a fixed proportion of formal sector, and that factor is updated every few
years by conducting a survey. Hence, measured GDP will understate the ef-
fects of demonetization. Second, as there was a shift away from cash to elec-
tronic means of payment, many under-the-table transactions were shifted to
the measured economy; any assumption that official and black market GDP
4
move together is probably invalid in that moment. Hence, I study the conse-
quences of demonetization in the cross-section of industries and firms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, I discuss
the contributions of this chapter and provide an overview of the related liter-
ature. In Section 2.2, I present a background of the main events surrounding
the demonetization episode, provide an account of the events that followed
the shock, and describe the legislative framework concerning labor regulation
in India that is relevant to my study. In Section 1.4, I sketch a model of how
firms react to the demonetization and summarize main results from the model.
I then present the data sources I use in Section 1.5 and discuss the empirical
strategy to test the model implications using the data in Section 3.5. I present
results in Section 2.5 and conclude in Section 1.8.
1.2 Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in three broad areas. First,
the findings in this chapter add to the growing list of studies that attempt to
unpack the effects of demonetization on the Indian economy. Second, view-
ing the demonetization episode as a natural experiment, specifically, as a large
and an unexpected monetary shock to the economy, the empirical findings in
this chapter provide support to the literature on identifying the real effects of
nominal disturbances. Third, my findings also highlight the link between the
formal and informal sectors in developing economies like India where there is
a prevalent use of informal employment and a heavy reliance on the informal
sector by firms in the formal sector in India.
An evolving number of papers attempt to identify demand-side impacts of
demonetization on the real economy3. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2018) exploit
3These are in the spirit of Velde (2009) who unpacks the effects of three overnight diminu-
5
the geographic distribution of demonetized and new notes in order to identify
the impact of the currency supply shock on real economic activity, deposits,
credit, and alternative forms of payment technology. This chapter also sheds
light on the aggregate effects of the demonetization episode. While their pa-
per focuses purely on identifying the demand-side effects from geographical
heterogeneity, I am able to identify significant supply-side effects by exploit-
ing cross-sectional heterogeneity across industries. On the household-side,
Karmakar and Narayanan (2019) provide additional evidence of households
without bank accounts witnessing declines in income and expenditure, and of
smoothing behavior by way of increased leverage from informal sources. On
the firm-side, Banerjee and Kala (2017) find from surveys that wholesalers and
retailers reported 40% lower sales in December and January.
Viewing the demonetization episode as an aggregate coordination device
and focusing on adoption dynamics by retailers, Crouzet et al. (2019) docu-
ment that the episode led to a permanent shift to electronic payments even
though the shock was transitory. Focusing on agricultural markets, Aggarwal
and Narayanan (2017) estimate the impact of demonetization on arrivals and
prices of agricultural commodities, and find reduced trade, arrivals and lower
prices in government regulated markets (or mandis) in the short-run. This de-
cline in prices appears to have recovered over a period of three months. Taken
together, the last two studies provide some evidence for significant supply-side
effects along with demand-side effects of demonetization.
Second, this chapter also relates to the literature that attempts to identify
the real effects of surprise nominal shocks to the economy. Many different ap-
proaches have been followed in order to identify these real effects from plau-
sibly exogenous variation in monetary policy (Christiano et al., 2005; Naka-
tions of gold and silver coins in eighteenth century France using a narrative approach.
6
mura and Steinsson, 2018). Some approaches include narrative studies such
as Romer and Romer (1989) who peruse historical records and select episodes
where there were large disturbances in monetary policy that were not driven
by the real sector. They then test whether output is unusually low (high) fol-
lowing the negative (positive) shocks of this kind. The Indian demonetiza-
tion is a well-suited episode for this kind of analysis, in that at least the pol-
icy was completely unanticipated and plausibly unrelated to the state of the
real economy, in addition to the shock banning 86% of currency-in-circulation.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) point out that in order to use the controlled ex-
periment method of identification in monetary policy, identification may come
from either “natural experiments” where the change in policy is large relative
to potential confounding factors, that may be controlled for, or, an approach
that focuses on large policy actions for which it can be plausibly argued that
potentially confounding factors are drowned out.
This chapter also relates to an older strand of literature in monetary theory
that asks whether money can be thought of as an input in the production func-
tion of firms4. Fischer (1974) provides two theoretical arguments that allow for
money to be treated as a factor of production, while also admitting that treating
money as an input in production is more for the convenience it offers5. In his
paper, he calls for a deeper explanation of the demand for money by firms. My
claim in this study is that if at least one type of input needs to be paid in cash,
this creates a need to firms for holding cash. Nadiri (1969) assumes a model
of a firm that minimizes costs subject to a production function which includes
cash as an input with an aim to estimate the determinants of real money bal-
4This was also pointed out in the Economic Survey 2016-17 as a thought exercise in order
to understand the aggregate supply side effects of demonetization (GOI, 2017).
5This is similar to the argument provided by Feenstra (1986), that there is a functional equiv-
alence between treatingmoney as an argument in the utility function and as an input that lower
liquidity costs.
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ances in the U.S. manufacturing sector. This chapter can be thought of as an
improvement over this approach in terms of identification.
My understanding of this strand of literature is that thinking about money
as an input in production provides for a good thought exercise that helps un-
pack the supply side effects of monetary shocks such as demonetization. Con-
sidering money as an input in the production function may proxy for the var-
ious uses of money to firms, insofar as the neoclassical production function is
itself a supposedly reduced form of an engineering relationship between var-
ious inputs and output. In this study, the function of money to firms is for
transaction purposes – firms need to pay for certain inputs in cash, and this is
the reasonwhy they hold real money balances. Tax evasion and the speculative
motive may very well be other reasons for which firms need to hold cash.
Lastly, my findings highlight the link between informal and formal activity
in India, specifically the use of informal employment by formal sector firms.
Formal sector firms recruit half of their labor force via informal employment6
(Narayanan, 2015). Typically, these workers get their wages in cash and are not
covered by regulatory provisions (RBI, 2017). Firms hire informal workers to
avoid providing for job benefits that comewith a contract, and for workers lack
of opportunities in the formal economymaymake informal employment lucra-
tive. Substituting permanent workers with workers on temporary, or even no
formal contract – a term coined as ‘flexibilization’ of labor – is a global trend,
and has increased especially in developing countries (Saha et al., 2013). Strict
regulatory provisions and open-ended contracts typically contribute to an in-
creased use of temporary workers (Balakrishnan et al., 2010). A report by the
ILO (2018) states that while more than 60% of the world’s employed popula-
tion earn their livelihoods from the informal economy, about 11% of informal
6Informal employment as a share of formal sector employment increased from about 38%
in 1999-2000 to more than 50% in 2011-12.
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workers are in the formal sector. Demonetization was expected to have dis-
rupted the informal economy disproportionately more than the formal econ-
omy, as the former is more cash-intensive. However, given the link between
informal and formal activity in India, demonetization must have affected firms
that were more exposed to the informal economy. Informal economic activity
is measured using surveys from time to time, and is estimated using indicators
and proxies from the formal economy7. To the extent that we have data only
for the formal economy, my results will be an underestimate of the true effect
of demonetization.
Additionally, given the setting of a removal of currency in a cash-intensive
economy, my findings also hint at some of the potential costs of abolishing cash
and provide additional support to the the provisions that need to be made by
the government before such policies are implemented. For instance, Rogoff
(2015) advises that access to free basic debit accounts and basic smartphones
must be in place before making the gradual transition to a cashless economy.
1.3 Background
In this section, I first describe the main events that took place following the
announcement of demonetization that document the shortage of cash faced by
the economy afterwards. Next, I provide accounts from newspaper reports
and anecdotal evidence pertaining to the cash shortage faced by firms focus-
ing on worker layoffs and job losses. Finally, I provide some background of
the legislative framework pertaining to labor in India that lead firms to hire
temporary, casual, and contract workers.
7For instance, manufacturing in India is proxied using the Index of Industrial Production
(IIP), which includes mostly large establishments. As noted in the Economic Survey 2016-17,
the effect of demonetization on informal economic activity will be underestimated (GOI, 2017).
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1.3.1 Demonetization
On November 8th, 2016, the Prime Minister of India announced via an un-
expected nationally televised address, that currency notes of the two largest
denominations, the |500 and |1,000 notes (worth about $7.5 and $15, respec-
tively), would be stripped of their status as legal tender (RBI, 2016). The stated
goals of the policy were to eliminate fake currency and impose losses on those
who held black money in the form of unaccounted earnings and bribes. These
objectives were justified by stating that fake currency was increasingly being
used to finance terrorism and that the policy would eventually reduce corrup-
tion. In order to achieve the policy’s objectives, the policy, including its an-
nouncement, had to be kept a secret and very few high-ranking government
officials knew about it prior to the televised address.
During the same address, the introduction of new |500 and |2,000 ban-
knotes with improved security features to replace the old ones was also an-
nounced. Holders of the old notes could either deposit them at banks in ex-
change for lower denomination or newer notes newer notes but could not use
them in transactions with effect from November 9th. Withdrawal and deposit
limits were placed on individuals and businesses in order to avoid excessive
currencywithdrawal due to public frenzy or fear and tomonitor large deposits,
respectively. The deadline to return the old notes was set at December 31st,
2016.
The demonetized notes accounted for about 86% of currency-in-circulation
(CIC) in value terms, which was nearly 12% of GDP in 2015-16. Effectively
the policy resulted in a sharp decline in total currency in circulation from a
pre-demonetization peak of about |15,205.65 billions to a post-demonetization
trough of |7,832.57 billions – which amounted to an actual decline of about
50% . Figure 1.B.1 plots total currency with the public and notes in circulation
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from fortnightly measures of money stock provided by the central bank. It
is worth pointing out that this data includes, both, the demonetization and
remonetization phase of the policy. The slow replacement of old notes with
new ones resulted in a sharp decline in CIC.
First, the new notes were not printed or distributed prior to the policy an-
nouncement. The amount of cash that needed to be printed was several mag-
nitudes higher relative to the usual printing activity undertaken by the print-
ing press. This slow process caused additional delays during the printing and
distribution process. Second, owing to the extreme secrecy of the operation,
retail banks were not informed before the announcement was made and were
thereby left unprepared with their capacities not updated to smoothly imple-
ment the replacement phase of the policy. One example is during the remone-
tization process, since the new currency notes differed in size compared to the
old ones, in order to put them into circulation ATMmachines needed replacing
which resulted in delays and slowed down the remonetization process. Third,
the general process of introducing new currency into the economy was subject
to the existing capacity of the central bank’s infrastructure, which could not
have been vastly updated prior to the announcement.
Holders of the old notes were forced to turn in their cash, either depositing
them in their banks accounts, or exchanging them for lower denomination cur-
rency. In addition to the inadequacy of currency supply, various limits were
placed on exchange and withdrawal of currency due to the cash shortage. Ini-
tially, the exchange of old notes was capped to |4,000 ($60) per person per day,
cash withdrawals from bank accounts at |10,000 ($150) per day and |20,000
per week ($300), and ATM-withdrawals were initially capped at |2,000 ($30)
per day per card. Exceptions were made in the case of purchasing airline or
train tickets, paying for utility bills, where old notes could be used. For small-
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businesses, withdrawals were restricted at |50,000 per week. Chodorow-Reich
et al. (2018) point out that withdrawal of new notes in an area was determined
by the supply of new notes to the same area. This provides evidence of the
economy being cash constrained in the short term.
1.3.2 Evidence of Cash Crunch faced by Firms and Job Losses
India is a heavily cash-based economy8. The months following the announce-
ment were filled with newspaper accounts of shortages of cash by households
and even by firms9. These included shortage of liquidity and working capital,
leading to worker layoffs, retrenchments, shutdowns, etc. Firms, and contrac-
tors employed to hire workers on behalf of firms, who pay their workers in
cash reported shortage of liquidity to pay employees their wages (Bhowmick,
2016). Such workers typically do not have bank accounts and are hence paid
daily wages in cash10. Facing cash flow issues contractors in labor-intensive
industries, such as garment manufacturing, were forced to let workers go and
some even shut down. Another article reported that the cash shortage had dis-
rupted the supply chain – trucks were left stranded with nomoney for fuel and
goods were not loaded because workers were not being paid (Choudhury and
Singh, 2016).
Supply chains even at medium and larger companies broke down, provid-
ing evidence of how much the organized corporate sector relied on cash to
8In 2012, 87% of transactions in India were cash based and typically even households with
access to formal banking carry a lot of cash, especially in high denomination bills, with them
(Mazzotta et al., 2014). Cash to GDP ratio was at 12.04% in 2013. To get a sense of this magni-
tude, this ratio for comparable countries was 3.93% for Brazil, 5.32% for Mexico, and 3.72% for
South Africa.
9In Mazzotta et al. (2014), the section on ‘Reasons and Attitudes to using cash in India’
states that “... more than half (55%) of those who use cash alone are either women engaged in
unpaid household work and casual laborers who do not have any regular source of income”.
10Due to the withdrawal limits placed on households, some laborers who had bank accounts
were unwilling to start accepting direct payment out of fear that they may lose their below
poverty line status (Pattanayak, 2016).
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conduct day-to-day operations. Business owners reported that the legally im-
posed withdrawal limit of |50,000 per week was not sufficient to cover ex-
penses, and that payment of wages to workers and transportation costs were
the major problem. Pattanayak (2016) reports that some industry executives
demanded a tenfold hike in the cash withdrawal limit of |50,000 per week in
order to be able to conduct certain necessary business transactions. Formal sec-
tor firms that relied on informal, cash-based channels were affected the most,
specifically firms in labor-intensive industries such as construction and build-
ing materials sectors, where contractors sill pay workers in cash. Dey (2016)
reports how an employer at a footwear manufacturing unit asked nearly 150
workers to go on unpaid leave for a month, citing his inability to pay their
wages at the time. Likewise contractors and landlords were unable to cover
wage expenses and were forced to let workers go, at least until they could lay
their hands on the new notes that were meant to remonetize the economy. In
the near-term they were severely cash constrained.
The RBI provided some relief by announcing, a month and a half later on
December 29th, that banks may provide an ‘additional working capital limit’ to
micro, small, andmedium enterprises (MSME) borrowers in order to overcome
any cash flow difficulties. This was an ad hoc one-time measure up to March
31st, 2017, after which working capital limits would revert to normalcy.
A study conducted by All India Manufacturers Organisation (AIMO) as-
sessing the impact of first fifty days of demonetization found considerable de-
clines in jobs in the manufacturing sector (Janardhanan, 2017). AIMO found
that medium scale industries with a staff strength of 300 to 700 suffered 3%
job losses and 7% loss in revenue. Large-scale industries, with 2,000 to 3,000
employees, experienced 2% job losses and 3% loss in revenue. Indeed, the
worst-hit sectors were those dominated by unorganized labor. The Center
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for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a private organization that collects
and analyzes business and economic data, reported that about one and a half
million jobs were lost from January, 2017 through April, 2017 (Vyas, 2017).
This includes organized and unorganized sectors, and agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors. Despite November being the festive season, labor force
participation rate (LFPR) fell to a new low of 44.8% (from 46.4% in the pre-
vious month), recovering slightly to 45.2% in the following two months. At
the same time, the unemployment rate fell from 6.8% (September-December,
2016) to 4.7% (January-April, 2017). This is most likely due to the increase in
working age population (persons greater than 14 years of age) while the num-
ber of employed in fact shrank. The recovery in LFPR was only moderate as
evidenced from the drop in its average: from 46.9% (January-October, 2016)
to 44.3% (January-April, 2017). These findings of long lasting effects are in
line with the recently released annual report by the government, the Periodic
Labour Force Survey (PLFS), that states that unemployment rate based on usual
status stood at 6.1% and current weekly status at 8.9% in 2017-1811.
1.3.3 Labor Regulations and Temporary Workers in India
A vast majority of India’s labor force comprises of informal workers. Informal
employment, including agricultural employment, accounts for 88.2% of total
employment (ILO, 2018). Excluding agriculture, more than 12% of these infor-
mal workers reside in the formal sector. The ILO (2016) finds that the share of
informal workers in the organized sector has increased significantly because of
a greater use of contract and other forms of casual labor12. Hsieh and Klenow
11Estimates based on usual status consider an individual’s principal status as well as and
subsidiary status in employment. While estimates based on currency weekly status provide a
picture of unemployment in a short period of seven days during the survey period.
12In 2011-12, 79% of non-agricultural wage workers had no written contract and only about
24% were eligible for social security benefits.
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(2014) point out that while nearly 70% of manufacturing output is in the formal
sector, a majority of manufacturing employment, nearly 80%, is in the informal
sector.
Labor regulation, specifically the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, and
its amendments, has been named as one of the primary causes formaking firms
reliant on contract, temporary, or casual workers (Bertrand et al., 2015; Chau-
rey, 2015)13. The IDA lays out rules and regulations that also govern layoffs,
retrenchments, strikes, and lockouts, and resolves labor-related disputes by
setting up special bodies to arbitrate them, thereby raising the cost of hiring
and firing workers, particularly for large firms. For instance, Section V-A of
the IDA states that retrenched workers are entitled to compensation equaling
15 days’ average wages for each year of service. A laid off worker is eligible for
50% of wages in addition to a dearness allowance per day (for a maximum of
45 days). The more severe Section V-B of the IDA calls for firms to obtain gov-
ernment permission to lay-off or retrench a single worker14. Taken together,
these laws make it immensely difficult and costly for firms to hire permanent
workers.
However, the IDA does not cover workers hired through contractors, tem-
porary hires without formal contracts, or casual labor15. Hence this allows
firms to circumvent the law allowing them to expand their workforce by em-
ploying these types of non-permanent workers. Firms also hire temporary
workers who work full-time because they can afford to pay them a lower wage
and can be hired and fired at will16. Figure 1.B.2 plots the share of temporary
13The ILO (2018) also finds that in countries characterized by pervasive labor regulation,
formal sector firms rely heavily on informal employment.
14Regulations in Section V-A apply for establishments with 50 or more workers and regu-
lations in Section V-B apply for establishments with 100 or more worker (Malik, 1997). These
types of firms would potentially be included in the sample I study in this paper.
15I use the terms – temporary workers, workers without a formal contract, and casual work-
ers – interchangeably in this paper.
16Table 1.B.2 presents the number and share of permanent and full-time workers involved
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workers as a share of total workforce for firms, surveyed in the World Bank
Enterprise Survey, 2014, that report employing any temporary workers. While
large firms typically hire fewer casual worker, the use of casual labor is widely
prevalent across the firm-size distribution.
The IDA is legislated by the central government and then amended by the
state governments as India follows a federal system of government. These
amendments have resulted in some states establishing “pro-worker” or “pro-
employer” labor regimes. Many studies have exploited this heterogeneity
across states in order to identify the effect of labor market regulation on for-
mal and informal manufacturing (Besley and Burgess, 2004), employment re-
sponses to shocks (Adhvaryu et al., 2013), and on contract labor use (Chaurey,
2015).
Apart from geographical variation, there also is considerable heterogene-
ity across industries in their use of casual labor. Figure 1.B.3 plots the share
of casual labor employed in the total workforce against the share of labor in
value-added for industries as classified in the KLEMS India 2015-16 database.
While the two are not tightly linked, there is in general a positive relationship
between the degree of labor-intensiveness in production and the share of ca-
sual labor used. Possibly labor-intensive industries (such as textiles or manu-
facturing of wooden products) face the brunt of “pro-worker” labor regulation
more, as compared to relatively less-labor intensive industries (such as man-
ufacturing of rubber and plastic products, or manufacturing of transportation
equipment) and hence must resort to hiring more casual laborers in order to
realize the economies of scale while minimizing firing costs.
I will exploit various measures of cross-sectional heterogeneity across in-
dustries as proxies for industry-exposure to the informal sector and informal
in production for all firms. On average, temporary workers are paid lower wages and work
fewer hours. Their share in production stands at about 15-17%.
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employment (for instance, industry use of casual labor) in order to identify the
effects of demonetization on firms. What is key is that these measures are from
before the demonetization episode, hence do not vary with time, but vary only
across industries.
1.4 Theory: The Effect of Demonetization on Firms
The goal of this section is to present a simple model of how firms may behave
after a demonetization shock that will help motivate the empirical tests that I
present later in section 3.5. To this end I sketch a static model of a production
environment characterized by heterogeneous firms that face a need for cash in
order to finance some factors of production.
The model consists of firms that use three inputs – capital, labor, and ma-
terials, denoted by K, L, and M, respectively. There are two types of labor
and materials: formal-type labor (LF) and formal-type materials (MF), and
casual-type labor (LC) and casual-type materials (MC) – in order to produce
an industry-specific output (Y). Assume that firms need to pay a sunk cost Y
before production begins, for instance, installation of machines and setting up
factories. Once this sunk cost is incurred, the production function for each firm
i in industry s is given by a constant-returns-to-scale technology as follows:
Ysi “ Kassi pLgsF,si ¨ L1´gsC,si qbspMdsF,si ¨M1´dsC,si q1´as´bs (1.1)
The model is set in partial equilibrium and all factors are supplied inelastically
at their given prices. Note that the shares of these factors are allowed to be
different across industries. Assume that inputs of the casual-type may only be
paid in cash. I do not explicitly model firms’ need for cash. Possibly one could
imagine that these workers do not have bank accounts or contractors who hire
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these workers only accept cash as it eliminates some type of friction. Further
assume that firms may enjoy some flexibility in hiring and firing casual-type
labor, possibly because they work without a formal contract, and hence firms
find a need for this specific type of input.
Timing. The model is completely static but within each period firms act ac-
cording to the following timeline:
(i) Firms withdraw (or set aside) some cash in order to pay for the casual-
type inputs.
(ii) Firms decide how much capital to employ, labor to hire, and materials to
procure.
• In normal times, when currency is in adequate supply, firms raise
as much cash as their first-best choice of LC and MC dictates and
the cash constraint will not matter for the optimal solution. In other
words, firms’ choices mimics the friction-less benchmark.
• After a demonetization shock, firms are now “cash-constrained” in
the sense that it is now difficult for them to obtain cash, although
they may have funds in less liquid forms17. Firms are now forced to
hire LC and procure MC that are lower than their first-best levels.
(iii) Firms produce and sell their output.
Wage and expense payments to formal-type laborers and formal-type mate-
rials suppliers, respectively, can be made using relatively more “sophisticated”
payment technology, such as direct deposit or checks18. Since casual-type la-
borers only accept cash19, firms face the following cash-in-advance constraint
17My definition of being cash constrained here differs from the usual definition in that it
refers to the inability to access liquidity rather than a firm having cash at the bank. In this
regard, my definition is similar to that of Karmakar andNarayanan (2019) who define liquidity
constrained households as those with access to bank accounts during demonetization.
18Credit may be used in which case, in this static framework, the interest rate on short-term
credit would be subsumed under the price of each factor.
19This is similar to Banerjee and Duflo (2014) who, in their model of credit constraints, dis-
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for casual-type inputs:
wC,siLC,si ` pC,siMC,si § C (1.2)
Here, wC,si stands for the wage rate paid to casual labor and pC,si stands
for the price of casual-type materials expenses. C stands for the amount of
cash firms set aside to fulfill their casual wage-bill. Demonetization in this
framework would result in a decline in the supply or value of cash available to
firms Cd † C.
I assume that firms minimize costs subject to (1.1) and (1.2). This cost-
minimization problem simplifies to:
minL “ wF,siLF,si `wC,siLC,si ` pF,siMF,si ` pC,siMC,si ` rKsi
` lrYsi ´ Kassi pLgsF,si ¨ L1´gsC,si qbspMdsF,si ¨M1´dsC,si q1´as´bss
` jpwC,siLC,si ` pC,siMC,si ´ Cq
(1.3)
This leads to a simple solution that says that the ratio of wages of the two
types of labor must be proportional to the ratio of its respective marginal prod-
ucts. That is, for a constrained firm (when j ‰ 0):
wF,si
p1` jqwC,si “
gs
1´ gs ¨
LC,si
LF,si
” MPLF,si
MPLC,si
Similarly for materials, the optimal solution for a constrained firm is:
pF,si
p1` jqpC,si “
ds
1´ ds ¨
MC,si
MF,si
” MPMF,si
MPMC,si
The only difference between the unconstrained and the constrained solu-
tion is that in the latter, the presence of the Lagrange multiplier on the cash
tinguish between inputs that are paid using working capital, that comes from bank credit and
market borrowing, and inputs that can be financed using trade credit.
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constraint, j, distorts the first order condition for casual-type labor casual-type
materials, and introduces a wedge between the optimal choices of the formal-
type input vis-à-vis the informal-type input. This multiplier is the shadow
value of cash to the firm and comes into play only when the cash constraint
binds (periods in which Cd † C).
This framework provides me with a way of thinking about how firms may
react after a demonetization shock. I summarize the intuition provided by the
model below. I then test these results using firm-level data with cross-sectional
variation across industries, and worker-level data for casual-type workers.
Result 1. When a firm is constrained on the supply of cash following demon-
etization, relative to its unconstrained first-best choice of casual-type labor and
materials, the constrained firm now employs fewer casual-type workers and
purchases fewer casual-type material inputs. Following demonetization, firms
in industries that employed more casual-type inputs (characterized by rela-
tively low values for gs and ds) employed fewer of these inputs.
Assume the wage rate for casual-type labor is lower than that of formal-
type labor, so that the MPL-per-rupee for casual-type worker is greater than
the MPL-per-rupee for formal-type worker20. Assume also that formal-type
labor is a fixed factor at some constant optimal level, LF,si “ LF,si, given that
firms face significant costs in hiring and firing formal workers. In this case,
the shadow value of cash is positive and following a demonetization shock,
cash-constrained firms hire fewer casual-type workers.
If
MPLC,si
wC,si
° MPLF,si
wF,si
, then ñ j ° 0
20Indeed, this result requires that nominal wages are rigid downwards, an assumption that
is consistent with the evidence found in Kaur (forthcoming) for wages in India due to which
equilibrium employment can be less than inelastically supplied labor. For a dynamic model of
demonetization with downward nominal wage rigidity, see (Chodorow-Reich et al., 2018).
20
Similarly, for materials, assume the price21 for casual-typematerials is lower
than the price for formal-type materials, so that the MPM-per-rupee for casual-
type materials is greater than the MPM-per-rupee for formal-type materials.
Once again, the multiplier j is positive, and cash-constrained firms purchase
fewer materials for production.
So far I have assumed that the upper bound on the cash constraint is fixed
and homogeneous across industry, at some arbitrary level C. However, this
need not be the case. If firms were indeed financing part of their wage-bill and
materials expenses using cash, their cash holdings prior demonetization may
provide information of their use of informal-type inputs
Result 2. Under the assumption that cash holdings may vary across indus-
tries depending on the intensity of use of informal-type inputs, firms in indus-
tries characterized by greater cash usage (cash relative to cost of inputs, for
instance) experienced more severe demonetization.
dLC,si
djs
† 0 and dMC,si
djs
† 0
This result states that firms in industries that experienced more severe de-
monetization will have sharper declines in casual-type inputs.
Given the static nature of the model, I do not explicitly allow for credit to be
an option in the case that a firm is cash constrained. However, in reality short-
term credit and sundry credit lines may help a firm smooth a liquidity shock
such as demonetization, by providing an alternate source of liquidity that is
not cash. However, it may be difficult to open such credit lines in the short
term that were not open before demonetization22.
21As noted by Chodorow-Reich et al. (2018), there was no discernible change in trend in con-
sumer price inflation and rural wage inflation (the only high frequency wage series available),
with both remaining positive, which is consistent with wage and therefore price rigidity.
22Typically, short-term working capital provided by banks are essentially credit lines with
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This simple model, under the plausible assumptions mentioned above, pro-
vides me with testable implications that I verify using firm-level and worker-
level data.
1.5 Data and Summary Statistics
1.5.1 Data
I combine data from a few different sources: quarterly data on firm financial
statements(income and expenses, and balance sheet items), an employment
survey, a census of manufacturing establishments, a survey of informal enter-
prises, and household panel with information on employment status, occupa-
tion, and demographics. All these sources including variables used from each
database are summarized in Table 1.C.1.
Firm-Level Panel Data
I use firm-level data from the Prowess database maintained by the Centre
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) from income-expenditure statements
and balance sheets23. This database covers publicly listed firms in the orga-
nized sector that consists of registered companies that submit quarterly finan-
cial statements. Although this database may not render a representative sam-
ple of Indian firms, it has three main advantages. First, Prowess contains de-
tailed information on items in the financial statements at a quarterly frequency,
as publicly-listed firms are mandated to report their quarterly financial state-
ments. The availability of data at a high frequency make them well-suited for
a pre-specified limit and an interest rate that is slightly higher than the prime rate (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2014). In addition to this, due to mandated lending laws such as “priority sector
lending”, banks require to lend at least 40% of their net credit to the “priority sector” which
includes agriculture, agricultural processing, transport industry, and small scale industries.
23The Prowess database has been used in many other studies, such as Asker et al. (2014),
Bertrand et al. (2002), and Alfaro and Chari (2014), to name a few. Companies in Prowess
together account for more than 70% of industrial output, 75% of corporate taxes, and more
than 95% of excise duty collected by the Government of India (Shah et al., 2008).
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a study that aims to identify the immediate or near-term effects of the demone-
tization episode. Second, the availability of data on various items from a firm’s
financial statement allows for an detailed analysis of the short-run effects of
demonetization on firms. Lastly, disclosure requirements for listed firms im-
ply that these data are reliable and comprehensive. The main disadvantage of
using this data is that the sample of firms is skewed towards medium and large
firms24. While the ideal data for a study of firms may be the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI), a census of registered manufacturing plants, these data are
available only at an annual frequency and hence render themselves unsuitable
for any short-term analysis. Prowess classifies firms by 5-digit industry codes
according to the National Industrial Classification (NIC-2008) code, the Indian
equivalent to the Standard Industrial Classification used in the US and UK.
Using this I merge firm-level data with variables from industry-level surveys I
describe below.
Industry-Level Data: Measures for Use of Informal Labor
I construct industry-level measures of cash usage, reliance on informal em-
ployment, and a indirect measure of firm-level exposure to the informal sector,
using data from an employment survey, a census of manufacturing plants, and
a survey of informal manufacturing enterprises. These data are all prior to the
demonetization episode.
Employment Survey Data. In order to obtain data on workers, the types of
jobs they work at, and the way in which they get paid, I use the 2011-12 Em-
ployment and Unemployment Survey (EUS), conducted by the National Sam-
ple Survey Organization (NSSO) in India every five years. This survey collects
information on individual characteristics, the nature of job, conditions of the
24I test for the effects of firm size in all my specifications using fixed effects based on size
deciles provided in Prowess and size fixed effects based on plant and machinery. I discuss
other shortcomings of this dataset in detail in Appendix 1.A.
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workplace, and social security benefits. The survey also contains the sector of
employment for each working individual according to the NIC-2008 classifica-
tion. The 2011-12 EUS included 101,724 households that consisted of 456,999
individuals. The data are representative at the level of regions as defined by
the NSSO. I construct two measures of informal employment using the nature
of employment (formal or casual) by looking at the worker’s principal activ-
ity status, and the nature of payment of wages to these workers (cash versus
non-cash).
Manufacturing Survey Data. In order to observe the use of cash by firms
across different industries, I use the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 2014-15,
which is a cross-sectional survey and census of manufacturing establishments
that is conducted by the Central Statistical Organization of India (CSO). These
data also contain information on the sector in which a factory belongs using
the NIC-2008 code. The combined ASI census and survey are representative
of all factories in India and are repeatedly used to estimate the performance
of the industrial sector, both regionally, as well as nationally. I construct two
measures of cash usage: one, the industry share of cash in current assets, and
two, the industry share of cash in total spending on labor and materials. The
first measure captures the extent of cash holdings as a fraction of liquid assets
of the firm, and the second measure captures cash used as a fraction of flow of
expenses.
Informal Sector Manufacturing Data. I compute net value added by infor-
mal enterprises at the 5-digit industy level, for which I use the Survey of Unin-
corporated Enterprises (Excluding Agriculture) from the 67th round of NSSO’s
enterprise survey. I match products used by firms to their respective industries,
as explained in Section 3.5, in order to distinguish between informally-sourced
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and formally-sourced raw materials.
Employment Status
Household Panel Data. In order to verify my firm-level findings, I use
worker-level survey data from Consumer Pyramids (CP), also maintained by
CMIE, for the period starting from May, 2016 through April, 2017. In recent
times, the CP has been widely used in the study of employment conditions in
India, a few papers include Chodorow-Reich et al. (2018); Crouzet et al. (2019);
Karmakar and Narayanan (2019), since India does not have an official monthly
household survey or a survey of establishments conducted by the government
until very recently in April 2018 with data going back to September 2017. Abra-
ham and Shrivastava (2019) show that the CP unemployment survey and the
NSS Employment rounds are comparable in terms of individual employment
status.
The unemployment module in the CP survey closely resembles the ques-
tions asked in the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the United States with
regard to employment status. An individual is counted as employed if, on the
day of or the day prior to the survey, the individual: (i) did any paid work, (ii)
was on paid or unpaid leave, (iii) was not working because his/her workplace
was temporarily shut down for maintenance or labor dispute but expected to
resume work within fifteen days, (iv) owned a business in operation, or (v) as-
sisted in a family business. The survey covers nearly 110,000 adults (persons
aged 15 and above) per month. The module also contains information on an
individual’s primary occupation which is defined as “the occupation which is
undertaken for maximum time during the day by a member”. Although the
scope of its definition is quite wide to ensure that everyone is associated with
an occupation, it contains some information on the nature of work undertaken
by the individual. I use this variable to define workers as casual-type workers
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and formal-type workers. See Appendix 1.A for further information on how
this variable is coded. The data have very few individuals who change their oc-
cupation during the period of study. I exclude individuals in the self-employed
category.
1.5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.C.2 reports summary statistics for the sample covering the pre-
demonetization period, that is 2015Q1 to 2016Q2. Labor’s share in value
added, as measures by net sales, is 10% for the average firm, while materials
share is close to 60%. Only about 4% of net sales is the value of cash balances
in the bank while sundry credit stands at a little above 50%. Since the Prowess
sample is skewed towards medium and large firms, these firms maintain very
little cash in hand. The large standard deviation possibly suggests that firms in
some industries need to hold more cash in order to conduct transactions. Pos-
sibly, most firms maintain as much cash as is needed to conduct transactions
and may decide to withdraw if more is needed.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis in this section derives directly from the simple model
of heterogeneous firms outlined in Section 1.4 where some production inputs
need to be paid for using cash. The basic intuition is that following a demon-
etization shock, firms are unable to conduct cash-based transactions, due to
the reduced aggregate supply of currency and their inability to immediately
substitute with credit, and are hence unable to hire and acquire labor and ma-
terials, respectively. Firms in industries that typically hire more casual-type
labor and use inputs predominantly from the informal sector are more depen-
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dent on informal employment and are more exposed to the informal sector.
Following demonetization, firms in these industries were treated with greater
intensity and were plausibly more cash constrained.
Exploiting cross-sectional heterogeneity of industry-exposure to informal
employment and the informal sector, I uncover the causal short-run effects
of demonetization. The unanticipated nature of the announcement provides
more credence to thismethod of identification. To the extent that these industry
and firm characteristics were uncorrelated with other shocks to the economy
during the period surrounding the episode, I can uncover the causal impact of
demonetization. Using representative data from worker-level and firm-level
surveys, I construct proxies of industry dependence on informal employment
and firm exposure to the informal sector. In the context of my empirical anal-
ysis, I use a difference-in-differences approach to causally identify the effect
of this inability to transact on two margins – the share of labor and the share
of material expenses in production. I focus on the financial years 2015 and
2016 in order to uncover the short-term effects. Specifically, the sample begins
on April 1st, 2015, and ends on March 31st, 2017, thereby avoiding the imple-
mentation of a new sales tax collection system from April 2017, another major
policy enactment.
1.6.1 Firm-level regressions
Labor. Exploiting variation in industry-dependence on casual labor and on
workers without formal contracts, I investigate whether being heavily reliant
on informal employment causes firms to hire fewer workers following demon-
etization by looking at firms’ labor share in value added. To do this I regress
the firm’s quarterly wage bill as a share of net sales for a firm i in industry j on
quarter dummies t for the periods following demonetization interacted with
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measures that proxy for industry-dependence on informal employment given
by zj. For outcome yijt, the baseline specification is25:
yijt “ b0 ` b1pDuringt ˆ zjq ` b2pPostt ˆ zjq ` gzj ` X1itG` µi ` lt ` #ijt (1.4)
where zj is either the fraction of workers with no formal contract or the fraction
of casual workers in industry j, Duringt is an indicator for the quarter during
which demonetization was announced (2016Q3) and Postt is an indicator for
the quarter immediately after demonetization was announced (2016Q4), lt are
quarter dummies, µi are firm fixed effects. Other controls include quarter fixed
effects, firm-level controls for size, demand and profitability, and firm fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
The dependent variable is the firm’s wage bill as a share of net sales. The use
of this dependent variable warrants some explanation. First, for labor input I
use the firm’s wage bill because firms in Prowess do not report employment in
their financial statements. The wage bill is arguably a better measure for labor
as it contains information on hours worked and human capital. Furthermore,
with respect to my analysis on informal employment, firms may underreport
the number of employees to evade labor regulation but this is less likely to
be the case with the wage bill. I take care to appropriately deflate the wage
bill and net sales measures using 2-digit industry deflators. Second, revenue-
based measures for labor share are used in other studies such as Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) that study misallocation by looking at wedges in the first order
conditions of firms. Third, Asker et al. (2014) uses net sales as a proxy for value
added using the Prowess dataset.
25The identification procedure followed here is similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998), who
study the effect of financial development on growth by looking at whether industrial sectors
that were relatively more in need of external finance developed faster in countries with more-
developed financial markets.
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The coefficients of interest, b1 and b2, uncover the short-term effects of expo-
sure to the informal sector on the firm’s labor share due to the demonetization
shock. The specification also helps control for other confounding shocks or
policies that may have impacted demand and supply similar to the argument
provided by Chodorow-Reich et al. (2018). This method relates well with other
empirical studies in the literature that use similar pre and post treatment pe-
riods and implement a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation strategy to
uncover the impact of a policy across treatment groups. I also follow the DID
estimation literature and cluster standard errors at the level of treatment as
suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004), which in this case would be at the indus-
try level j. I also estimate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and find
similar results.
Materials. Most firms use a combination of intermediate inputs in produc-
tion. Each of these inputs are sourced from various different industries, some
are sourced from the informal sector and some from the formal sector. Firms
in Prowess provide information on their material inputs expenditure annually.
I exploit this information and compute firms’ exposure to the informal/formal
sector sector for a given mix of materials used in production. In order to do
this, I proceed in three steps:
1. First, I compute the share of each material input l in a firm’s material
expenditure bill. Prowess contains information on specific products used
by firms and the expense incurred thereof. These data are from firms’
annual financial statements from 2015. Later, for robustness, I calculate
averages of these shares for five years prior. Material expense incurred
by a firm i in industry j using an input l that is produced by industry j1
is denoted by mlij:j1 . For any firm i, the share of this intermediate input in
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total expenditure on intermediate inputs is given by:
@l m
l
ij:j1
Lÿ
l“1
mlij:j1
where l “ 1, 2, ..., L.
2. Next, for each input I map product codes (for material inputs) to their rel-
evant 5-digit NIC industry codes. For each of the J industries, I compute
the share of value added by the informal sector in that industry over total
value added (sum of formal and informal sectors).
yC,j1
yC,j1 ` yF,j1
where yF,j1 (yC,j1) denotes total value added by the formal (informal) sec-
tor and j1 “ 1, 2, ..., J.
3. Lastly, I multiply the firm i’s material input share (calculated in point
1) by the respective industry’s informal sector share in production (in
point 2) for each product used by the firm, and sum across all Lmaterials
used. This measure gives me a measure of the firm’s total exposure to the
informal sector for a given mix of materials used in production. For firm i
in industry j, I define:
Exposureij “
Lÿ
l“1
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
mlij:j1
Lÿ
l“1
mlij:j1
¨ yC,j1
yC,j1 ` yF,j1
‹˛‹‹‹‹‚ (1.5)
where j, j1 “ 1, 2, ..., J.
Using this as a source of variation at the firm-level, I test whether differ-
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ences in greater exposure to the informal sector for intermediate inputs caused
firms to procure fewer inputs in the periods after demonetization. Similar to
the specification in equation (2.3), I regress the firm’s quarterly total materials
expenditure as a share of value added for a firm i in industry j on quarter dum-
mies t for the periods following demonetization interacted with Exposureij as
defined in point 3. The dependent variable is the materials expenditure share
in value added (using net sales as a proxy for value added). For outcome yijt,
the baseline specification is:
yijt “ b0 ` b1pDuringt ˆ Exposureijq ` b2pPostt ˆ Exposureijq ` gExposureij
` X1itG` µi ` lt ` #ijt
(1.6)
where all variables are as defined in the specification in equation (2.3) and
Exposureij is as defined in (1.5). Other controls include quarter fixed effects,
firm-level controls for size, demand and profitability, and firm fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
1.6.2 Worker-level regressions
In order to investigate whether casual-type workers were relatively more likely
to become unemployed following demonetization, I estimate the following
specification:
uidt “ b0 ` b1pPostt ˆCasual Workeriq ` gpCasual Workeriq
` X1itG` qd ` lt ` #idt
(1.7)
where uidt takes on a value 1 if individual i in district d is unemployed on
date t of the survey. The indicator variable CasualWorkeri equals 1 for in-
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dividuals who are either casual or temporary workers, and zero otherwise26.
Postt equals 1 for the months following demonetization. The sample runs from
May, 2016 through April, 2017 – six months before and after demonetization.
Individual-level controls X1it include age, age-squared, education, literacy and
caste. qd stands for district fixed effects and lt stands for month fixed effects.
The coefficient of interest is b1. Owing to the specification and the structure of
the survey I cannot distinguish between contemporaneous and lagged effects.
1.7 Results
In this section, I first present the results for firm-level regressions for labor and
materials as specified by equations (2.3) and (1.6), respectively. Then I present
results from the household panel for worker-level regressions as specified by
equation (1.7). I present the firm-level regressions with and without firm fixed
effects, with firm-level controls measured contemporaneously with the out-
come, as well as one year lagged controls also with and without firm fixed
effects in order to account for variation that is unobserved at the firm-level.
Contemporaneous controls are unfortunately also contaminated by the shock
and to this end I use the previous year’s variables as controls. I also control for
quarter fixed effects in all specifications.
1.7.1 Labor and Informal Employment
Use of Cash: I begin by testing the premise that firms that used more cash were
disproportionately affected by demonetization in their ability to pay for labor.
The mechanism at play is the following: after the demonetization shock firms
that typically make more cash payments were left cash-constrained and were
26See Appendix for 1.A for how this variable is coded.
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hence unable to pay wages to informal workers who would only accept pay-
ment in the form of cash. To test whether this was the case I examine whether
firms in industries with a greater share of cash in current assets and total
costs27, prior demonetization, witnessed relatively larger declines in their labor
share in net sales in the periods immediately after demonetization. The results
of these regressions are reported in Tables 1.C.3 and 1.C.4. We see a decline in
the labor share of firms in industries with greater cash usage in the quarter of
and after the shock that is consistent across all specification. Columns 1 and 2
in Table Tables 1.C.3 capture the main effects of the shock on firms’ labor share,
and I control for firm fixed effects in the latter. When I control for firm size,
demand, and profitability using contemporaneous controls, in columns 3 and
5, the size of the coefficients of interest decline sharply. Using lagged controls
in columns 4 and 6 increases the magnitude of the effect and this is statistically
significant in both quarters. In Table 1.C.4, the magnitude of the coefficients of
interest remain fairly stable. A one standard deviation increase in share of cash
in current assets is associated with a 3% decline in the mean of labor’s share in
net sales. This translates to a 0.3 percentage point decline in the labor share.
Dependence on Informal Employment: In order to verify the mechanism, I ex-
amine whether firms that are more reliant on informal employment were dis-
proportionately affected by demonetization. I find large declines in firms’ la-
bor share in the quarters after the shock that were relatively more dependent
on informal employment, suggesting that these firms were possibly cash con-
strained, hence unable to pay for temporary labor in cash, and were thereby
forced to let go of their temporary workforce. Using firm-level surveys con-
ducted prior to demonetization, I construct proxies for informal employment
such as the share of casual workers in total workforce in an industry and the
27Total costs here is defined as the cost of inputs involved in production, namely wage pay-
ments and raw materials expenses.
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fraction of casual-type wage payments made to workers in an industry. The
construction of these variables are relegated to the appendix. Table 1.C.5 re-
ports results when informal employment is measured as the fraction of casual
workers in total workforce in an industry j. The magnitude of the coefficient
of interest is larger for the quarter after relative to the quarter during demon-
etization. This is unsurprising as the policy was enacted in November, 2016,
which falls right in the middle of 2016Q3, hence only about half of Q3 was
“treated”. Table 1.C.6 reports results when informal employment is proxied by
the fraction of casual-type payments made to workers in an industry j. Here
the coefficient of interest is significant at the 10% level only in 2016Q4, while
the coefficient for 2016Q3 is only significant for the specifications that include
contemporaneous controls, it is consistently negative and smaller in magni-
tude. In line with previous results for cash usage, a one standard deviation
increase in exposure to informal employment is associated with nearly a 3%
decline in the mean labor share in the quarter of the shock and a 3.5% decline
in the quarter immediately after the shock.
1.7.2 Materials and the Informal Sector
Use of Cash: Next, I examine whether firms that used cash to purchase interme-
diate inputs were disproportionately affected in their ability to pay for these
inputs following demonetization. The mechanism is similar to that for labor,
in that firms may be paying for some inputs in cash, and due to the shortage
of cash, were left cash-constrained and could not pay for these inputs. Similar
to the procedure implemented for labor and informal employment, I examine
whether firms in industries with larger shares of cash in current assets and
total costs, prior demonetization, faced relative reductions in their materials
expenses after the shock. The results of these regressions are reported in Ta-
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bles 1.C.7 and 1.C.8. The main effects presented in columns 1 and 2 in Table
1.C.7 are negative but not statistically significant, while in columns 3-6 the co-
efficient on the interaction term for 2016Q3 is stable and significant at the 10%
level. Similarly in Table 1.C.8, the coefficient is negative and significant at the
10% level, and is stable across columns 1 through 6. A one standard devia-
tion increase in share of cash in current assets is associated with a 2.6% decline
in the mean of materials share in net sales which translates to a 1.6 percentage
point decline in the materials share in net sales. The stability of the coefficient’s
magnitude to the inclusion of fixed effects and lagged controls suggests that
while firms did face some reduction in their materials expenses, these were not
as large as that of labor. This may potentially be a result of the fact that firms
purchase a variety of intermediate inputs from suppliers not all of which are
paid for using cash. This suggests an approach that takes into account the dif-
ferent types of products that a firm purchases and the degree of informality of
the industry that supplies the respective products. I present the results for this
exercise below.
Exposure to the Informal Sector: Exploiting the availability of information on in-
termediate inputs purchased by firms, I construct a measure of indirect expo-
sure to the informal sector (unregistered enterprises) at the level of the firm
by merging product codes of inputs to their respective industries, both, in the
formal and informal sector. This Exposure measure takes into account firms’
input mix and the extent of value added by informal enterprises vis-à-vis to-
tal (formal and informal enterprises) value added as outlined in Section 1.6.1
in equation (1.5). Using this I test whether firms that were more dependent
on the informal sector for intermediate inputs were hurt more by demoneti-
zation. More informally-produced inputs are likely to be paid for in cash and
we would expect firms that purchase more of these inputs to witness relatively
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larger declines in their materials share in value added, as they may have been
unable to pay for them. The results of these regressions are reported in Table
1.C.9. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficient for the interaction term for 2016Q3
is statistically significant at the 10% level and is stable to the inclusion of firm
fixed effects. In specifications that include contemporaneous controls that are
potentially also treated, columns 3 and 5, the coefficient of interest is negative
but not significant. In columns 4 and 6, the specifications that include lagged
controls for firm-level shocks and characteristics, the coefficient for the inter-
action term for 2016Q3 is statistically significant. A one standard deviation in-
crease in Exposure is associated with a 0.4 percentage point decline in materials
share in net sales.
1.7.3 Effects on Employment by Worker Type
I verify my results from the firm-side with worker-level regressions using the
CP survey data. In order to test my findings, I look at whether casual and
temporary workers were more likely to be unemployed in the months fol-
lowing demonetization. Table 1.C.10 presents results from the regression in
Equation (1.7). The sample consists of observations running from May, 2016
to April, 2017, thus providing for six months before and after demonetization.
In column 1, I control for month fixed effects, and in column 2 I control for
district fixed effects. Additional controls in columns 3 and 4 include age, age-
squared, education, caste, and literacy. Column 4 also controls for the individ-
ual’s lagged employment status. In all specifications, I uncover a positive and
statistically significant coefficient for b1, the coefficient of interest on the inter-
action term. I find that in the months following demonetization, the unem-
ployment rate for casual or temporary workers was 0.20% higher than formal
or full-time workers. These results, taken together with the firm-level results,
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complete the story that the cash contraction had sharp negative effects on em-
ployment possibly because firms were unable to pay their workers in cash. It
seems plausible that it may be virtually costless for the firm to let these work-
ers go in the face of an adverse shock and hire temporary workers back again
later.
1.8 Conclusion
This study documents the supply-side effects of a large unanticipated currency
contraction. I exploit the 2016 Indian demonetization that rendered 86% of cur-
rency in circulation illegal overnight as a natural experiment to identify the real
effects of a nominal liquidity shock. Due to the high use of cash in India, the
presence of a large informal sector and the prevalence of informal employment,
even among formal sector firms, the Indian environment provides a good ex-
perimental setting for this study. Using cross-sectional variation in usage of
cash, exposure to the informal sector and reliance on informal employment I
study whether firms in industries that were more exposed were disproportion-
ately affected by the shock. These industry measures proxy for the extent of
informal employment (casual/temporary workers), the use of cash, and expo-
sure to the informal sector in the cross-section of industries. The sudden and
unanticipated nature of the announcement provides credence to this identifica-
tion strategy and helps unpack the causal effects of the demonetization shock
by naturally producing firms that were treated with different intensities.
I find significant supply-side effects of demonetization in the period imme-
diately after demonetization. Firms that use cashmore andwere more exposed
to the informal sector witnessed significant declines in their labor share and
materials share in value added after the unanticipated shock. In order to iden-
tify this effect, I construct various measures of cash usage, reliance on informal
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employment, and exposure to the informal sector using surveys of workers,
industries, and informal enterprises. On the worker-side, I find that casual-
type workers were more likely to report being unemployed in the months after
demonetization relative to formal-type workers. Taken together these findings
highlight the near term effects of demonetization. Similar to the approach fol-
lowed by Chodorow-Reich et al. (2018), my identification strategy based on the
cross-section of industries and firms best serves for near term analysis.
Indeed my findings were to some extent anticipated as documented in
the preliminary macroeconomic assessment of demonetization by the Reserve
Bank of India (RBI). RBI (2017) points out that due to the limited access of cur-
rency following the announcement, workers who get paid wages in cash expe-
rienced temporary loss of work28. More specifically, the report mentions that
labor-intensive sectors that engage casual/migrant workers relatively more
must have been disproportionately adversely affected. This essentially sums
up the identification strategy that I adopt in this study: some industries were
treated more by the shock relative to others as they face a greater need to trans-
act in cash. Furthermore, the Economic Survey 2016-17, produced by the Gov-
ernment of India (GOI, 2017), points out that one of the three broad channels
through which demonetization affects the economywas as an aggregate supply
shock, to the extent that economic activity utilizes cash as an input (for exam-
ple, agricultural labor is traditionally paid in cash; some companies may pay
their employees’ salary in cash). The report also admits that in India the in-
formal and formal economies are “inextricably entwined, so that problems in one
inevitably affect the other”, providing the example that many firms in the formal
economy depend on suppliers from the informal economy (including labor).
My results also indicate that these negative effects are relatively smaller or
28See pp. 2-3 from the cited report.
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even dissipate in the quarter after the demonetization announcement. How-
ever, given that available data exclude the informal sector, which was presum-
ably most hurt by the shock, these findings are a conservative lower bound of
the total effects. There may be eventual gains from moving towards a cash-
less economy, however my study focuses on the immediate real impacts felt by
firms, suppliers and workers due to the liquidity crunch.
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APPENDIX
1.A Data
1.A.1 Main Data Sources
Consumer Pyramids. Coding of Casual Type Worker:
• Individuals with the following occupations are classified as “casual or
temporary workers”: Agricultural Labourer, Small Farmer, Small Trader
/ Hawker / Businessman without Fixed Premises, Support Staff, and
Wage Labourer.
• Individuals with the following occupations are classified as non-casual or
non-temporary workers: Businessman, Industrial Workers, Legislator /
Social Worker / Activists, Manager, Non-Industrial Technical Employee,
Organised Farmer, White Collar Clerical Employees, and White-Collar
Professional Employees and Other Employees.
• Individuals with the following occupations are not included in either
classification: Home Maker, Home-based Worker, Self Employed En-
trepreneur, Self employed professional, Self Employed Entrepreneur, Un-
occupied, Student, NonSchooling Child, and Qualified Self Employed
Professionals.
Prowess. The Prowess database has been used in many other studies, such as
Asker et al. (2014), Bertrand et al. (2002), and Alfaro and Chari (2014), to name
a few. Companies in Prowess together account for more than 70% of industrial
output, 75% of corporate taxes, and more than 95% of excise duty collected
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by the Government of India (Shah et al., 2008).. While Prowess is not, strictly
speaking, a panel, since data may be missing for certain time periods for var-
ious reasons, I construct a non-missing panel of firms by dropping firms that
have missing observations for the years 2015 and 2016. Additionally, the sam-
ple of firms in Prowess is skewed towards medium to large firms. Figure 1.B.1
compares the firm size distribution in the sample of firms from Prowess that I
use in this study with that from the Annual Survey of Industries. Prowess has
virtually no micro enterprises. Restricting the firm size distribution to small,
medium, and large firms, it is clear that the sample is skewed towards large
firms. To the extent that small and medium sized firms faced a greater inability
to smooth the demonetization shock, my results in this study are an underesti-
mate of the true effects representative of the entire firm size distribution.
1.A.2 Supplementary Data Sources
The supplementary data used in this paper come from a range of sources. The
main data sources used in the empirical analysis are presented in 1.5. In addi-
tion to those I use the India KLEMS Database 2015-16 maintained by theWorld
KLEMS Initiative in order to create some of the figures. I map industries in the
KLEMS database to their 2-digit counterparts using the RBI’s Data Manual.
I also use wholesale price indices to deflate all nominal variables. The data
on wholesale prices are obtained from the Ministry of Commerce Industry
website maintained by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Inter-
nal Trade (DPIIT). I map industries in the WPI data to the two-digit industry
codes from the NIC-2008 classification.
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1.B Figures
Figure 1.B.1: Measures of Currency Supply
Source: Database of Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of india. Notes:
Dashed line indicates the date of announcement of demonetization.
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Figure 1.B.2: Full-Time Temporary Workers as a share of Total Workforce
Source: Author’s calculation using World Bank Enterprise Survey 2014.
Notes: For firms that report a non-zero share of temporary workers.
Dashed line indicates mean value.
Figure 1.B.3: Labor Share in Value-Added and Casual Labor
Notes: Dashed lines indicate median values. Source: Author’s calculations
using KLEMS India Database 2011-12.
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(a) Firm Size Distribution – Including “Micro” enterprises
(b) Firm Size Distribution – Excluding “Micro” enterprises
Figure 1.B.1: Sample Composition
Source: Author’s calculation using Prowess and Annual Survey of Industries 2014-15. Notes:
This definition of firm size is based on the value of plant and machinery for manufacturing
enterprises as per the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED
Act).
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1.C Tables
Table 1.C.1: Data Sources
Variables Source Name
Standalone interim quarterly financial
statements for 2015-17
Centre for Monitoring the In-
dian Economy (CMIE)
Prowess
Balance sheet items (cash holdings, cur-
rent assets, cost of production) of formal
sector firms within 5-digit industries
Central Statistical Organization
(CSO) of India
Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI), 2015-16
Share of informal employment in total
workforce within 5-digit industries
National Sample Survey Orga-
nization of India
Employment and Unemploy-
ment Survey, 2011-12
Products and by-products manufac-
tured by 5-digit industries in the infor-
mal sector
National Sample Survey Orga-
nization of India
Unincorporated Non-
Agricultural Enterprises,
2010-11
Employment status of working-age
members from a household panel for
2016-2017
Centre for Monitoring the In-
dian Economy (CMIE)
Consumer Pyramids
Table 1.C.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Share of Wage Bill in Value Added 0.10 0.09 0.08 2,250
Share of Materials in Value Added 0.62 0.84 0.61 2,230
Net Sales 4,887 37,138 558 2,250
Wage Bill 263 1,110 41 2,250
Operating Expenses 4,161 30,008 519 2,250
Operating Income 4,161 30,008 572 2,250
Plant and Machinery (A) 8,289 54,572 672 2,165
Sundry Creditors (A) 2,578 18,232 229 2,150
Cash Balances at Bank (A) 20 177 1 1,998
Cash in Hand (A) 3 12 1 7,950
Notes: Data correspond to the pre-demonetization period (2015Q1 to 2016Q2). Data are
in millions of rupees, apart from the share variables. Variables denoted by “A” in paren-
theses indicate that those variable are from firms’ annual financial statements. All other
variables are at a quarterly frequency from the firms’ quarterly financial statements.
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Table 1.C.10: Employment Status and Worker Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post ˆ Casual Worker 0.0019˚˚˚ 0.0019˚˚˚ 0.0020˚˚˚ 0.0018˚˚˚
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Casual Worker 0.0006˚ 0.0005 -0.0000 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 461,620 461,620 461,620 331,400
Clusters 421 421 421 419
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0026
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE No Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes
Lagged Employment Status No No No Yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the individual’s labor market
status at the time of the survey, zero if currently employed and one if unemployed. Post is
a dummy variable that equals one for all the months after demonetization was announced.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the district level. This table reports the impact of
demonetization on an individual’s employment status by worker type in the months follow-
ing the demonetization announcement corresponding to the specification in Equation (1.7).
Controls include Age, Age2, Education, Caste, and Literacy. The sample consists of observa-
tions running from May, 2016 to April, 2017 (six months before and after demonetization).
CasualWorker is a dummy that equals one for workers whose occupation can be categorized
as temporary or casual workers. See Appendix 1.A for how this variable is coded.
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CHAPTER 2
DIRECTED LENDING AND MISALLOCATION: EVIDENCE
FROM INDIA
[WITH DEEKSHA KALE]
2.1 Introduction
Access to finance remains a crucial barrier for the growth of small and young
firms in many countries (León-Ledesma and Christopoulos, 2016). Govern-
ments typically use targeted lending programs or subsidized credit policies to
help small and young firms become more efficient and unlock larger scales of
production. By eliminiating credit barriers, these programs intend to level the
playing field among firms of different sizes thus helping them expand their
capital and scale up production. Two natural questions a policy maker would
like to have answers for are: Do such policies channel funds efficiently to credit
constrained firms? And at a macro level, can targeted credit policies lead to im-
provements in aggregate productivity?
In this chapter, we use a policy change that affected the flow of credit by ex-
panding eligibility of firms to a nationwide directed credit policy. Small firms
that were previously excluded were brought under the purview of the priority
sector lending program. We first show that credit constrained firms used this
credit to expand their physical assets. We show how the credit policy affects
aggregate productivity via a decline in misallocation by reducing the disper-
sion of marginal revenue products across firms within an industry. Then we
quantify the extent of misallocation resulting from the policy, specifically, we
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provide a lower bound of the magnitude.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we construct measures of marginal
revenue products of capital (MRPK) for firms from the period before eligibil-
ity to the lending policy was modified. We use these to classify firms as con-
strained and unconstrained by comparing their ex ante levels of MRPK vis-à-
vis industry median MRPK using within-industry variation in MRPK. We then
implement a tripled-differences empirical strategy to estimate the effects of the
expansion of eligibility for directed credit on misallocation of capital across
firms. The approach is in the spirit of (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) in identify-
ing gaps in the marginal products of capital of firms within narrowly defined
industries. Second, we combine these reduced-form estimates with a newly
developed theoretical results, stemming from the work by (Baqaee and Farhi,
2019), to quantify the effect of the policy on aggregate productivity. Specifically,
we estimate a lower bound of the true effect of the policy on manufacturing
productivity.
We find three main results. First, we find that the directed credit program
changed eligible firms’ input wedges by demonstrating that for firms with ex
ante higher MRPK, the policy resulted in relatively larger increases in installed
physical capital. Firms with relatively higher MRPK also saw declines in their
MRPK in the period after the programwas initiated. Physical capital increased
by 7% and owing to the expansion capital constrained firms witnessed a de-
cline in their MRPK by about 8%. Second, we find that industries with a greater
fraction of firms that were eligible for directed credit and with high ex ante
MRPK witnessed a statistically significant decline in dispersion of MRPK as
measured by the interdecile range ofwithin-industryMRPK. A one standard de-
viation increase in the industry-level treatment variable results in a 30% decline
in the mean value of the interdecile range. However, using other measures of
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dispersion, like the standard deviation and interquartile range ofMRPK, we do
not observe a statistically significant decline. Third, using these reduced-form
estimates as well as parameters estimated from firms’ production function, we
calculate the lower bound of the effect of the policy on aggregate manufactur-
ing productivity using changes in the Solow residual to be 16%.
This chapter relates to two main strands in the literature. First, this chapter
relates to the literature that aims to evaluate the role of credit on the perfor-
mance and growth of small firms. Second, this chapter also relates to the more
recent literature on identifying the sources of misallocation across firms, and
quantifying the effects of specific policies in either reducing or increasing mis-
allocation.
With respect to the literature on the role of credit on the performance of
firms, numerous studies have looked at how access to finance, alleviating
credit constraints, the different types of credit, have significant consequences
for the growth of young and small firms. Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006)
document that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) face larger barriers to
growth and lack adequate access to finance, thereby contributing less to eco-
nomic growth. The paper highlights that financial and institutional develop-
ment can help alleviate SMEs growth constraints thereby leveling the play-
ing field between firms of all sizes. This is especially relevant in developing
economies that are characterized by a large but unproductive SME sector and
a few large firms that have well-established formal sources of finance. Banerjee
and Duflo (2014) identify severe credit constraints using Indian data and lever-
aging a directed lending policy change similar to the one we consider in this
chapter.
Cross-country evidence fromGalindo, Schiantarelli, andWeiss (2007) points
out that financial liberalization has increased the efficiency with which funds
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are allocated across firms. However the authors point out there is little evi-
dence of the effect of relaxing financial constraints on the efficiency of resource
allocation for small firms. We do know that even in developed economies like
the US, information constraints can severely reduce access to credit for small
firms (Berger et al., 2005). Perhaps León-Ledesma and Christopoulos (2016) is
the most comprehensive study that tests the role of access to finance and pri-
vate versus public credit in determining misallocation. They use cross-country
data and find that access-to-finance obstacles increase the dispersion of distor-
tions in inputs across firms leading to a fall in total factor productivity. Their
indirect calculations also point to capital misallocation.
The literature on misallocation has focused on measuring the degree of and
identifying all possible sources of misallocation by using firm-level data and
pointing to the dispersion in marginal products of inputs. Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) identify large distortions that lead to dispersion of TFP across firms in
narrowly-defined industries in India and China relative to the US. They take
the approach of modeling wedges in the allocation of inputs that arise due
to government policies that distort firms’ allocation of resources. Economists
have attempted to identify such policies and market distortions that generate
misallocation. Alfaro and Chari (2014) suggest that deregulation of industries
can affect resource misallocation and the firm-size distribution by increasing
entry of small firms. David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2016) point to
imperfect information in the allocation of firms’ inputs as a source of misallo-
cation. Using a quantitative model, Jo and Senga (2019) analyzes the aggregate
effects of government policies that attempt to alleviate credit constraints for
small and young firms and finds that while credit subsidies resolve resource
misallocation and improve aggregate productivity, increased factor prices, in
equilibrium, leads to fewer firms in production, which decreases aggregate
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productivity. These general equilibrium effects depend on the underlying dis-
tribution of firms and their financial status.
To the best of our knowledge the misallocation literature has not empiri-
cally identified the effect of providing access to finance to small firms on mis-
allocation and therefore on aggregate productivity. Some studies that iden-
tify a causal link between external funding and economic growth, although
not through the misallocation channel, include Rajan and Zingales (1996),
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Maksimovic (2008). Our approach identifies changes in these wedges due to
the credit policy that provided access to finance after accounting for other un-
observed firm and time effects that are uncorrelated with the policy. In equi-
librium there may be other consequences of directed lending programs such
as the costs of crowding out smaller and younger firms as pointed out by Kale
(2017) who finds that smaller firms were crowded out by relatively larger firms
that becamse eligible for the directed lending program in India. There could
also be unintended negative real effects where firms give up growth in order to
maintain access to finance. Bhue, Prabhala, and Tantri (2019) show that firms
that are closer to the upper bound of the eligibility threshold grew slower than
firms that were further away for the same directed lending program1. Other
costs that are not the focus of this study include the cost subsidizing credit for
firms through taxes paid for by households, of lending to less creditworthy
borrowers, to name a few, that may be of consequence for aggregate welfare.
We focus only on the misallocation channel which is affected by a discontinu-
ity in the credit policy that in turn affects aggregate productivity. In terms of
1The underlying finding is that small business lending could prove to be a disincentive for
growth, so firms try to remain small so as to maintain eligibility, as otherwise the firm loses
access to credit and the bank loses a potentially creditworthy borrower. Although this could
be the reality it could also be that firms closer to the eligibility threshold have low marginal
products of capital to begin with, which explains their slow relatively rate of growth of invest-
ment.
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methodology, this study is closest to Bau and Matray (2020) in which where
the authors document the effect of providing firms access to foreign capital
on misallocation and aggregate productivity. Their study exploits variation
coming from staggered industry liberalization policy to provide reduced form
estimates that they translate to measuring the lower bound effect of the policy
reform on manufacturing productivity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we provide
a brief background of the directed lending policy in India and the 2006 policy
change. In Section 2.3, we sketch the framework for estimating the reduced-
form and the quantitative effects of misallocation. In Section 3.5, we discuss
the data that we use and the main empirical strategy, and in Section 2.5, we
present the results. We then conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Background
Directed Lending in India. Small and young firms form a large part of the
firm-size distribution in both developed2 and developing countries. These
policies typically take the form of mandating lending, loan guarantees, and
interest rate caps. The premise behind these targeted programs are that: (i)
small business are engines of economic growth, and (ii) market failures impede
their growth, thereby justifying government intervention (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). The primary goals of these policies are to provide access to credit
and ease credit constraints for specific sectors or firms that are otherwise finan-
cially constrained.
Directed lending in India takes shape via the Priority Sector Lending (PSL)
program. As part of this program, commercial banks are mandated to lend
2For instance, the US Small Business Administration (SBA) provides loan guarantees for
small business entrepreneurs in order to strengthen access to capital.
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40% of their Adjusted Net Bank Credit or Credit Equivalent Amount of Off-
Balance Sheet Exposure, whichever is higher, to specific priority sectors such as
agriculture, and micro and small enterprises, students for education, and low
income groups and weaker sections of society. Over time the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) has expanded the set of sectors that are designated as priority
sectors. Banks are required to meet the overall 40% target as well as other
internal sub-targets, and these are communicated via Master Circulars3 and
updates to the specified guidelines issued therein. These guidelines do not
specify a rate of interest for priority sector loans.
India’s PSL policy is based on size as defined by investment in plant and
machinery4. Banks can lend to micro and small enterprises belonging to any
industry in order to meet the priority sector targets. Banks that do not meet
the specified targets are penalized by the RBI. Banks are required to lend their
shortfalls from the specified targets to Rural Development Bonds at a very low
interest rate that is decided by the RBI. If they repeatedly fall short of meeting
the targets, banks can be disallowed from opening new branches across the
country.
Policy Change in 2006. In October 2006, the Government of India enacted
the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act (MSMED), 2006, to
“facilitate the promotion and development” of small and young firms. The
MSMEDAct covered various aspects of support including employees’ skill de-
velopment and training, marketing assistance, strengthening backward and
forward linkages, as well as credit support.
As part of credit support, the Act also created an expansion in in the pool of
3These Master Circulars can be found on the RBI’s website: see here.
4While there is no universal definition for a small business, many countries use number of
employees as cutoffs and these cutoffs vary across countries and sometimes across industries
within a country (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2011).
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firms that were eligible for directed credit. Previously, small firms that whose
value of plant and machinery was between |2.5 and |10 million were eligible
for directed credit. After the MSMED Act was enacted, this investment thresh-
old was expanded to include firms whose investment in plant and machinery
does not exceed |50 million5. Previously eligible firms continued to remain eli-
gible for directed lending. The banking sector as a whole was also encouraged
to increase their lending to SMEs by directing banks to achieve a 20% year-
on-year growth in loans made to SMEs, and eventually doubling the lending
amount over five years.
SME size limits have been modified prior to this instance. In 1998, the limit
was changed from |6.5 million to |30 million, and again in 2000 it was reversed
downwards to |10 million. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) study both these policy
changes using loan-level data from a single large bank. They first identify se-
vere credit constraints and show that newly eligible borrowers use this credit
to expand production – as evidenced by increased rate of growth in sales and
profits – for the 1998 policy change and decreased production in the 2000 pol-
icy reversal. Small firms are characterized by credit constraints that play a key
role in lending outcomes and firm growth, and looking at (relative) marginal
products of capital is one way to analyze their effects. In the next section we
sketch a framework that helps in analyzing the effects of the directed lending
policy for constrained vis-à-vis unconstrained firms.
5I exclude enterprises belonging to the service sector as they faced a few different set of
guidelines. The analysis in this study focuses on a sample of manufacturing firms.
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2.3 Misallocation: Reduced-Form to Aggregate Ef-
fects
In this section, we first sketch a simple framework that shows how policy af-
fects misallocation for constrained vis-à-vis unconstrained firms. Then we pro-
vide the equation that used to quantify aggregate effects of these changes in
misallocation.
2.3.1 Framework for Reduced-Form Estimates
In this section we present a simple model of how misallocation distorts firms’
allocation of inputs due to the presence of wedges that act as taxes on the prices
of inputs. This is the standard approach in the literature. Suppose the price
paid by a firm i for an input x is p1 ` t˜xi qPx, where Px denotes the price of
input x P tK, L,Mu, where K, L, and M denote capital, labor, and materials,
and t˜xi is the additional wedge that the firm needs to pay over the market price
(txi † 0 indicates a subsidy, and txi ° 0 indicates a tax). The firm’s profits can
be written as:
Pi “ PiFipKi, Li,Miq ´
ÿ
xPtK,L,Mu
p1` t˜xi qPxxi
where Fip¨q denotes the firm’s production function, which exhibits diminishing
marginal returns in each input.
Cost-minimization implies that the firm will equate marginal returns for
each input with marginal cost:
Pi ¨ BFipKi, Li,MiqBxi “ µip1` t˜
x
i qPx
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where Pi denotes the firm’s products market price and µi denotes the markup.
Define the combined wedge as 1 ` txi “ µip1 ` t˜xi q. For any input xi, its
marginal revenue product (MRPX) is directly proportional to its combined
wedge. Firms that have higher input wedges for a certain input will have
higher marginal revenue products on that input.
A decline in misallocation will have several effects on inputs and MRPX.
For firms with a high wedge on input x, a decline in misallocation of input x
will reduce its wedge txi relative to other firms. This implies MRPX will also
fall and usage of input x will increase. The increase in in one input may have
spillover effects on other inputs by increasing the marginal revenue products
for those inputs and hence demand for those inputs. Using more inputs will
allow these firms to produce more and earn more revenue. Hence, for firms
with high capital wedges (say), we expect the policy to cause firms to increase
capital, labor, and sales, and decrease MRPK. In the data, we would expect
these effects to be differentially stronger for constrained (high MRPK) firms
relative to less constrained firms.
2.3.2 Aggregate Effects using the Solow Residual
In order to estimate the aggregate effects of a decline inmisallocation, we quan-
tify changes in the Solow residual, which measures net output growth minus
net input growth, using the first order approximation from Baqaee and Farhi
(2019) of industry I over time as follows:
DSolowI,t «
ÿ
iPI
li ¨ D log Ai `
ÿ
iPI
xPtK,L,Mu
li ¨ axi ¨ txi ¨ D log xi (2.1)
where li is firm i’s share of sales in manufacturing industry’s net output, axi
is the output elasticity of i with respect to input x, txi is firm i’s input wedge
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on input x, and D log Ai is the firm-specific change in total factor productivity.
This expression converts firm-level effects using reduced-form estimates into
aggregate effects6. This expression allows me to estimate the Solow residual
of industry I due to the policy by estimating the components of the right hand
side of equation (2.1). In subsection 2.5.3 we explain how these numbers are
estimated from firm-level data.
2.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Data Sources
In this section, we first describe the data sources used in this study. In the
second subsection, we explain how firms in the sample are classified as high
or low MRPK firms. And in the third subsection, we describe the empirical
strategy.
Prowess database. The main source of data used in this study comes from
firm financial statements from the Prowess database maintained by the Centre
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The Prowess database consists
of a firm-level panel7 that comprises of income-expenditure statements and
balance sheets of firms. The data covers all publicly-listed firms and many
private firms as well, and it has been used widely in many other studies8. The
data are representative of medium and large firms in Indian manufacturing.
Some of the key variables we use include firms’ sales, capital stock (measured
by gross fixed assets), wagebill, raw materials expenses, and profits. Prowess
6Refer to the appendix in Bau and Matray (2020) for a derivation of this expression.
7We construct a panel that consists of non-missing firm-year observations for the period
between 2004 and 2009.
8The Annual Survey of Industries, which is a plant-level census of Indian manufacturing
firms, is the other commonly used dataset and is not a panel.
64
classifies firms using a 5-digit industry-level code according to the National In-
dustrial Classification (NIC-2008) code, the Indian equivalent to the Standard
Industrial Classification used in the US and UK. Table 2.1 provides summary
statistics for all manufacturing firms in the Prowess database between 2004
and 2006.
Other data sources. The firm-level variables are in revenue terms, not in
quantities, and hence need to be deflated. We use the wholesale price index9 to
deflate all variables using 2-digit industry-level deflators that are merged with
the firm-level data.
In order to compute li, the share of firm i’s sales in industry sales that is not
re-used by the manufacturing industry, from equation (2.1), we use data from
India’s input-output table drawn from theWorld Input-Output Database10. We
calculate the share of output that is re-used by manufacturing as inputs and
scale total industry sales by 1 minus this share. li is then equal to firm i’s sales
over this number.
2.4.2 Classifying Firms as High or LowMRPK
In this subsection, we describe how firms are classified as having high or low
MRPK. In order to assess whether the policy increased or reduced misalloca-
tion, following the logic outlined in subsection 2.3.1, we test whether the re-
form had a differential effect on firms with high vis-à-vis low MRPK. We use
the Cobb-Douglas production function, as is commonplace in the production
function estimation literature, where we assume that firms operate using the
9These data come from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, and
can be found here: https://eaindustry.nic.in/download_data_0405.asp.
10See http://www.wiod.org/home
65
following production function:
Yijt “ AijtKa
K
j
ijt L
aLj
ijtM
aMj
ijt (2.2)
where i stands for a firm, j for a 2-digit industry, and t for a year. Yijt, Kijt,
lijt, Mijt, are (revenue) measures of output, assets, the wage-bill, and materials,
and Aijt denotes firm-specific unobserved productivity. Output is proxied with
sales. As the data come from firm financial statements that do not contain
information on quantities, this production function is in revenue terms. We
deflate the variables appropriately using wholesale price indices.
Estimating MRPK. We estimate the marginal revenue product of capital by
using the fact that with a revenue-based Cobb-Douglas production function,
MRPK “ BYijtBKijt “ a
K
j
Yijt
Kijt
and owing to the assumption that firms in an industry have a constant aKj , the
output-capital ratio, YijtKijt , provides a within-industry measure of MRPK. The
advantage of this measure is that it imposes very few data requirements which
make it possible to use the largest amount of data.
Following Bau and Matray (2020), in order to determine whether firms had
a high or low MRPK prior to the policy reform, we proceed in two steps. First,
we construct an average measure of a firm’s MRPK over three years of the pre-
reform period from 2004 to 2006. Then, we classify a firm as capital constrained
(or highMRPK) if its average is above the 4-digit level industry median. Figure
2.1 shows the distribution of log(MRPK) as measured by the methodology de-
scribed above. This measure is confounded by measurement error. However,
there seems to be a considerable amount of capital misallocation prior to this
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lending policy.
2.4.3 Econometric Specification
Firm-level regressions. In order to asses the effect of the policy on the re-
allocation of resources within industries, our baseline regression specification
is:
yijt “ b0 ` b1
´
1REi ˆ 1HighMRPKij ˆAftert
¯
` b2
´
1REi ˆ t
¯
` b3 ¨ 1REi
` X1itG` I1jtF` µi ` lt ` #ijt
(2.3)
where i stands for a firm, j for an industry, t for a year, and yijt is the out-
come variable of interest that consists of the logs of physical capital, MRPK,
the wagebill, and revenue11. 1REi is an indicator that equals one if firm i be-
came “Recently Eligible” (i.e., plant andmachinery valued at |10 million to |50
million) due to the policy change. 1HighMRPKij equals one if the firm was clas-
sified as having high MRPK (constrained) during the pre-policy period. The
indicator Aftert equals one for all the years after the year of the policy change
(2007-09) and zero otherwise.
The control group consists of firms that are ineligible for the directed lend-
ing policy (i.e., firms with plant andmachinery valued over and above |50 mil-
lion). We drop firms that were always eligible, both, before and after the policy
change (i.e., firms with plant and machinery valued between |2.5 million and
|10 million). We consider a three-year estimation window before and after the
policy change. This is because in 2010 two regulatory changes – deregulation
of the interest rate regime and the introduction of a credit guarantee scheme
targeted at small firms – were implemented, and these are likely to bias the
11Revenue-based measures are used as proxies for quantity-based measured in other studies
such as Asker et al. (2014) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), among others, that study misalloca-
tion by looking at wedges in the first order conditions of firms.
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results.
The coefficient of interest b1 uncovers the relative differential effect of the
policy on newly eligible firms that have ex ante high MRPK relative to low
MRPK firms. If b1 ° 0, then the policy caused a relative increase in yijt to con-
strained (high MRPK) firms that became eligible following the policy change
relative to unconstrained firms. Xit include firm-level controls for profitability
and size that capture, respectively, the effects of demand and firm-size (and
age). Industry-level controls, contained in Ijt, such as the growth rate of indus-
try output and total industry output, capture the effects of industry-specific
shocks to productivity and demand. We include firm fixed effects to control
for time-invariant firm characteristics and year fixed effects to account for ag-
gregate national-level shocks that are not specific to any firms or industries.
We also control for linear time trends that may potentially affect the dependent
variable for the treated group of firms. And finally, standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level. Treatment is at the firm level12 i, hence the focus is on
within-firm changes in distortions before and after the policy.
Industry-level regressions. To evaluate how the level of misallocation
changed at the industry level as a result of the policy, we test the following
empirical specification:
s
mrpk
jt “ b0 ` b1
´
FracRE,HighMRPKj ˆAftert
¯
` b2 ¨ FracRE,HighMRPKj
` I1jtF` qj ` lt ` # jt
(2.4)
where the dependent variable is a measure of dispersion (standard deviation,
interquartile range, or the interdecile range) of MRPK within industry j in year
t. The variable FracRE,HighMRPKj is the fraction of recently eligible firms with
12A set of firms in any industry j become eligible for the credit program based on their value
of plant and machinery.
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high MRPK over the total of eligible firms and ineligible firms within a 2-digit
industry j, thus measuring the intensity of treatment at the industry level. For
any industry j, this fraction can be written as:
FracRE,HighMRPKj “
∞
i
´
1REij ˆ 1HighMRPKij
¯
∞
i
´
1REij ` 1NEij
¯
Industry controls such as the total industry output and industry fixed as-
sets are contained in Ijt. These capture the effects of industry-specific shocks
on changes to misallocation. Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across
industries are absorbed by industry fixed effects qj. These capture the effects
of industry-specific policies enacted by the government to boost productivity.
Year fixed effects lt capture any macro-level fluctuations that impact all firms
in the sample during the period of this study.
The coefficient of interest b1 measures the differential effect of the policy on
the degree of within-industry misallocation on industries that have a greater
fraction of “treated” firms (eligible with high MRPK) relative to industries that
were treated with less intensity.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Firm-level Outcomes
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of the differential effects of the policy with re-
spect to the baseline specification, equation (2.3). The table presents estimates
of b1, our coefficient of interest on the interaction term, for the four main out-
come variables – capital, MRPK, wagebill, and income. The sample consists of
firms that were “recently eligible” for the credit program and firms that were
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ineligible (much larger firms13).
In the three-year period after the eligibility to directed credit was modified,
high MRPK (or capital constrained) firms invested more and increased physi-
cal capital (row 1 of Table 2.2). Physical capital increased by 7% and along with
this expansion, capital constrained firms witnessed a decline in their MRPK
(row 2) by about 8%. While these changes are strongly statistically significant,
there seem to be no significant change in the wagebill14 and revenues (rows 3
and 4, respectively). It is worth pointing out that the signs on these coefficients
point in right direction as theory would suggest.
These results are robust to the inclusion of firm controls to proxy for firm-
level shocks to productivity, demand, and profitability, as well as industry-
level controls that proxy for industry size and growth. All specifications con-
trol include year and firm fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks and un-
observed firm-level time-invariant shocks, respectively.
2.5.2 Industry-level Outcomes
Next, we present the effects of the policy on the level of misallocation at the
2-digit industry level. We measure the degree of misallocation using a mea-
sure of dispersion of industry-level MRPK. Table 2.3 shows the estimates of b1,
the coefficient on the interaction term from equation (2.4), for three different
measures of dispersion: the standard deviation, the 75th minus the 25th per-
centile (interquartile range), and the 90th minus the 10th percentile (interdecile
13We control for variations in firm size within the sample using fixed effects and firm-level
controls.
14The Prowess data do not report the number of employees but only the total wagebill.
This is problematic for the results because we cannot distinguish between a change in the
wagebill that is due to a change in: (i) the number of employees, (ii) wage rates, or (iii) the
skill-composition of firms’ labor force. It is likely that changes in all of these components of
the wagebill may confound the results.
70
range)15.
The sample consists of firms that became eligible and those that remained
ineligible throughout the estimation period. The greater the fraction of “re-
cently eligible” firms with highMRPK in any industry j, the greater is the treat-
ment intensity of the credit policy. We test this hypothesis by interacting the
variable FracRE,HighMRPKj , as defined in subsection 2.4.3, with the post-period
dummy Aftert. If relaxing credit constraints allows capital constrained firms
to invest more then industries with a higher fraction of treated firms will expe-
rience significantly larger relative reductions in the dispersion of MRPK.
In the period after the policy was changed, industries with a greater fraction
of “recently eligible” firmswith highMRPKwitnessed a statistically significant
decline in dispersion of MRPK as measured by the interdecile range (row 3,
Table 2.3). A one standard deviation increase in the treatment variable results
in a 30% decline in the mean value of the interdecile range. In line with the
firm-level results, the gains from reallocation were not large enough to result in
statistically significant decline in the standard deviation and the interquartile
range. It is worth pointing out, however, that the signs of the coefficients are
all consistently negative. We control for total sales and fixed assets as proxies
for production and industry size. Industry fixed effects capture all unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity that
2.5.3 Aggregate Effects
Our results so far have established that capital constrained firms that became
eligible to the credit policy expanded by investing more in physical assets, and
this results in a decline in misallocation, although only for one measure of dis-
persion of MRPK – the interdecile range. In this subsection, we quantify the
15We normalize the interquartile range and the interdecile range by dividing them by 100 to
make the coefficients comparable.
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effects of this reduction on aggregate productivity for the eligible firms using
equation (2.1).
Identification. Our goal is to estimate the parameters in equation (2.1) using
the reduced-form regressions. The equation can be split into two parts: (i) a
change in firm-level productivity, and (ii) and change in firm-level inputs. The
first part, within-firm productivity, is given by D log Ai, and since we do not
observe any significant changes of the policy on firm-level productivity, we
set D log Ai “ 0. The components of the second part of equation (2.1) can be
obtained from data or estimated from firm-level data using the policy change
as a natural experiment.
We estimate li as the share of firms’ total sales in industry net output that is
not re-used as manufacturing inputs16. The values for axi are obtained directly
from the estimates of the production function. For each of the inputs, capital,
labor, and materials, we estimate D log xi from the average treatment effects
using a simple triple differences strategy as follows:
log xijt “ b1
´
1REi ˆ 1HighMRPKij ˆAftert
¯
` b2 ¨ 1REi ` X
1
itG` I1jtF` µi ` lt ` #ijt
(2.5)
where log xijt is one of the three inputs. This provides an estimate of the
change in inputs used between the pre- and post-period due to the policy
change and we estimate the change in inputs due to the policy, {log xijt, asxb1 ´1REi ˆ 1HighMRPXij ˆAftert¯`xb2 ¨ 1REi .
Estimating firm-level wedges. All that remains in order to estimate equation
(2.1) is the estimation of txi , the firm-level input wedges prior to the policy. We
16Using the World Input-Output Database, we calculate the share of output that is re-used
by manufacturing as inputs and scale total industry sales by 1 minus this share. li is then
equal to firm i’s sales over this number.
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follow the procedure adopted in Bau and Matray (2020) and estimate a lower
bound of the effects of the policy on the Solow residual since measurement
error in inputs or marginal products greatly affects the dispersion in wedges.
We need to make two assumptions to estimate a lower bound on the
wedges. First, we assume that the policy did not subsidize treated firms in
the sense of making their wedges negative (the policy does not increase misal-
location). Second, we assume that firms that were ineligible to the credit policy
did not see any significant change in their wedges. This simply means that
ineligible firms form the control group in equation (2.5). Defining the post-
policy wedge for a firm as txPost “ txPre ` Dtx, where Dtx is the change in the
wedge of input x due to the policy, and assuming that txPost • 0, the least value
for the pre-treatment wedge is ´Dtx. This is due to the assumption that after
the policy there are no wedges remaining in any of the inputs that are due to
misallocation but could still remain due to mismeasurement. Estimating Dtx
provides a lower bound of the pre-treatment wedge that we then use to esti-
mate equation (2.1).
Assume that true marginal revenue product of input x for firm i, denoted
by mrpxit, is observed with measurement error. Measured marginal revenue
product is given by logpMRPXitq “ logpmrpxitq ` µi ` lt ` #it, where µi is
a firm-specific, time-invariant shock, lt is a year-specific shock, and #it is an
idiosyncratic error term. The true marginal revenue product for input x be-
fore the policy has taken effect is given by logpmrpxit “ logp1` txitqq ` logppxt q.
After the policy has taken effect (when Aftert “ 1) for recently eligible firms
(RE=1), due to the assumption that treated firms have zero post-policy wedges,
logpmrpxitq “ logppxt q, and
logpMRPXitq “ logppxt q ` µi ` lt ` #it
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Owing to the assumption that the policy does not change the wedges of
untreated, or ineligible, firms (RE=0):
logpMRPXqit “ logp1` txitq ` logppxt q ` µi ` lt ` #it
Consider the triple differences regression:
logpMRPXijtq “ b1
´
1REi ˆ 1HighMRPXij ˆAftert
¯
` b2 ¨ 1REi ` X
1
itG` I1jtF` µi ` lt ` #ijt
(2.6)
The firm-specific shock will be absorbed by firm fixed effects µi. The time-
specific shock along with changes in logppxt qwill be absorbed by the year fixed
effects lt. The identifying assumption here is that #it is orthogonal to treatment
so that. Er#it|X1it, I1jts “ 0. Then estimates from the triple-differences regres-
sion will allow us to predict logp1` txi q. Using this we can back out the input
wedges by computing ptxi “ exp´ {logp1` txi q¯´ 1.
We estimate the following triple-differences regression for the three inputs’
marginal revenue products:
logpMRPXijtq “ b1
´
1REi ˆ 1HighMRPXij ˆAftert
¯
` b2 ¨1REi `X
1
itG` I1jtF`µi`lt` #ijt
Using the estimates from this regression, we can estimate the wedges as
follows:
log {p1` txi q “xb1 ´1REi ˆ 1HighMRPXij ˆAftert¯`xb2 ¨ 1REi
Using estimates for all the components of equation (2.1), we can now calcu-
late the effect of the policy on the Solow residual and we find that the lower
bound effect is a 16% increase between the pre- and post- period of the policy
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change.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we study whether targeted lending programs can affect the mis-
allocation of capital by channeling credit to firms with high marginal products
of capital. We leverage a policy experiment that expanded the eligibility of
firms to a nationwide directed credit program. The results document the link
between targeted credit policy and misallocation for small firms.
The directed lending policy identifies a large pool of firms that became el-
igible for loans. We exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in marginal revenue
products of capital (MRPK) across firms within industries to classify firms
as credit constrained (high MRPK) vis-à-vis unconstrained using the value of
their MRPKs relative to the industry median prior to the policy. We then com-
bine these reduced-form estimates and estimates from the production function
to quantify the effect of the policy on aggregate productivity.
If new investment projects were financed from credit that flowed to firms
with relatively high MRPK, this would cause a decline in the dispersion of
MRPK and therefore reduce within-industrymisallocation. We identify that for
firms with initially higher MRPK, the policy resulted in relatively larger in-
creases in physical capital in the period after the credit policy was modified.
We also find that as capital increases for constrained firms, these firms exhibit
a decline in their MRPK relative to unconstrained firms. However, we find no
statistically significant change in the wagebill and revenues. At the industry
level, the number of newly eligible firms varies quite a bit. This would sug-
gest that within-industry misallocation reduced in industries with relatively
more “treated firms” – newly eligible firms with high MRPK. We exploit het-
erogeneity in treatment intensity across industries and find that industries with
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a larger fraction of eligible firms with high MRPK relative to the total number
of firms witnessed a decline in dispersion of MRPK as measured by the in-
terdecile range. We then quantify the aggregate effects of this reduction in
misallocation on aggregate productivity using changes in the Solow residual
as a proxy. Using the reduced-form estimates and estimating parameters from
firms’ production functions, we find that the policy increased the manufactur-
ing industry’s Solow residual by at least 16%. Since measures of misallocation
that use changes in firms’ input wedges can be greatly influenced by measure-
ment error, we focus on estimating a lower bound that accounts for this error.
This study is important for two reasons. First, this study documents how
targeted credit policy can lead to improvements in productivity by reducing
misallocation across firms. This relates to the vast literature on the importance
of small and young firms, and policies that aim to enhance their productivity.
Second, this study quantifies the effect of the policy on aggregate productivity.
These findings are important for the policy maker to help in designing efficient
credit policies and evaluating their effects on firms. Since targeted lending
is prevalent across many developing and developed countries, it is important
to study their effectiveness and evaluate whether they succeed in leveling the
playing field for firms.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Log(MRPK), 2004-2006
Source: CMIE Prowess Database, Author’s calculations. Notes:
This figure shows the distribution of log(MRPK) for
manufacturing firms in the Prowess data for 2004-06.
77
2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median N
Capital 1,266 7,525 164 8,154
Wagebill 102 695 16 8,115
Sales 2,083 10,118 382 8,154
Income 2,166 11,014 387 8,154
PBIT 286 2,375 22 8,154
Notes: Data correspond to the period before the policy
change (2004-06). Data are inmillions of rupees, apart from
the share variables.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Firm-Level Specification
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Capital 0.0692˚˚˚ 0.0731˚˚˚ 0.0711˚˚˚
(0.0267) (0.0235) (0.0235)
MRPK -0.0834˚ -0.0841˚˚˚ -0.0823˚˚˚
(0.0474) (0.0273) (0.0273)
Wagebill 0.0302 0.0318 0.0318
(0.0326) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Income 0.0118 0.0071 0.0059
(0.0414) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Observations 15,438 15,438 15,437
Clusters 2,638 2,638 2,638
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program by firms’ ex-ante capital constraints (proxied
by their MRPK) as specified by Equation (2.3). This table reports estimates of b1 for all the dependent
variables of interest. The respective dependent variable is as specified in column 1. Controls include
proxies for firm-level profitability and size, and industry-level averages of total sales and growth rate
of sales. Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.3: Industry-Level Misallocation
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
S.D. (MRPK) -0.3196 -0.7028 -0.3767
(1.4310) (1.4654) (1.5299)
Disp. (75 – 25) -0.0794 -0.1156 -0.1086
(0.0894) (0.0986) (0.0949)
Disp. (90 – 10) –0.2515˚ -0.3253˚˚ -0.2880˚˚
(0.1494) (0.1347) (0.1229)
Observations 126 126 126
Clusters 21 21 21
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program on a within-industrymeasure of dis-
persion as specified by Equation (2.4). This table reports estimates of b1 for all the dependent
variables of interest. The dependent variables are measures of dispersion as listed in column
1. Controls include industry-level averages of sales and capital. Robust standard errors,
reported in parentheses, are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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APPENDIX
2.A Tables
Table 2.A.1: Baseline Specification, Log(Capital)
(1) (2) (3)
1RE ˆAftert ˆ1High MRPK 0.0692˚˚˚ 0.0731˚˚˚ 0.0711˚˚˚
(0.0267) (0.0235) (0.0235)
Recently Eligible ˆ t -0.0611˚˚˚ -0.0533˚˚˚ -0.0527˚˚˚
(0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0063)
Observations 15,438 15,438 15,437
Clusters 2638 2638 2638
Mean of Dep. Var. 5.52 5.52 5.52
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program by firms’ ex-ante capital contsraints (proxied
by their MRPK) as specified by Equation (2.3). The dependent variable is the firms’ Log(Capital) .
Controls include proxies for firm-level profitability and size, and industry-level averages of total
sales and growth rate of sales. Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the
firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.2: Baseline Specification, Log(MRPK)
(1) (2) (3)
1RE ˆAftert ˆ1High MRPK -0.0834˚ -0.0841˚˚˚ -0.0823˚˚˚
(0.0474) (0.0273) (0.0273)
Recently Eligible ˆ t 0.0381˚˚˚ 0.0566˚˚˚ 0.0560˚˚˚
(0.0142) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Observations 15,438 15,438 15,437
Clusters 2638 2638 2638
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.62 0.62 0.62
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program by firms’ ex-ante capital contsraints (proxied
by their MRPK) as specified by Equation (2.3). The dependent variable is the firms’ Log(MRPK)
. Controls include proxies for firm-level profitability and size, and industry-level averages of total
sales and growth rate of sales. Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the
firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.A.3: Baseline Specification, Log(Wagebill)
(1) (2) (3)
1RE ˆAftert ˆ1High MRPK 0.0302 0.0318 0.0318
(0.0326) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Recently Eligible ˆ t -0.0405˚˚˚ -0.0289˚˚˚ -0.0289˚˚˚
(0.0094) (0.0076) (0.0076)
Observations 15,386 15,386 15,385
Clusters 2637 2637 2637
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.09 3.09 3.09
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program by firms’ ex-ante capital contsraints (proxied
by their MRPK) as specified by Equation (2.3). The dependent variable is the firms’ Log(Wagebill)
. Controls include proxies for firm-level profitability and size, and industry-level averages of total
sales and growth rate of sales. Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the
firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.4: Baseline Specification, Log(Income)
(1) (2) (3)
1RE ˆAftert ˆ1High MRPK 0.0118 0.0071 0.0059
(0.0414) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Recently Eligible ˆ t -0.0292˚˚ -0.0039 -0.0037
(0.0118) (0.0040) (0.0040)
Observations 15,438 15,438 15,437
Clusters 2638 2638 2638
Mean of Dep. Var. 6.14 6.14 6.14
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program by firms’ ex-ante capital constraints (proxied
by their MRPK) as specified by Equation (2.3). The dependent variable is the firms’ Log(Income) .
Controls include proxies for firm-level profitability and size, and industry-level averages of total
sales and growth rate of sales. Robust standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the
firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2.A.5: Industry-Level Misallocation, S.D. (MRPK)
(1) (2) (3)
FracjRE,High MRPK ˆ Aftert -0.3196 -0.7028 -0.3767
(1.4310) (1.4654) (1.5299)
FracjRE,High MRPK 1.4197 1.3870 1.8926
(1.2237) (1.2496) (1.4823)
Observations 126 126 126
Clusters 21 21 21
Mean of Dep. Var. 1.48 1.48 1.48
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program on a within-industrymeasure of disper-
sion as specified by Equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the within-industry S.D. (MRPK)
(normalized). Controls include industry-level averages of sales and capital. Robust standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 2.A.6: Industry-Level Misallocation, Disp. (75 – 25)
(1) (2) (3)
FracjRE,High MRPK ˆ Aftert -0.0794 -0.1156 -0.1086
(0.0894) (0.0986) (0.0949)
FracjRE,High MRPK 0.0864˚˚ 0.1047˚˚ 0.0743˚
(0.0401) (0.0532) (0.0368)
Observations 126 126 126
Clusters 21 21 21
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.03 0.03 0.03
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program on a within-industrymeasure of disper-
sion as specified by Equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the within-industry Disp. (75 – 25)
(normalized). Controls include industry-level averages of sales and capital. Robust standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 2.A.7: Industry-Level Misallocation, Disp. (90 – 10)
(1) (2) (3)
FracjRE,High MRPK ˆ Aftert -0.2515˚ -0.3253˚˚ -0.2880˚˚
(0.1494) (0.1347) (0.1229)
FracjRE,High MRPK 0.1426 0.1449 0.1154
(0.1715) (0.1782) (0.1247)
Observations 126 126 126
Clusters 21 21 21
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.08 0.08 0.08
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes
Notes: This table reports the impact of the PSL program on a within-industrymeasure of disper-
sion as specified by Equation (2.4). The dependent variable is the within-industry Disp. (90 – 10)
(normalized). Controls include industry-level averages of sales and capital. Robust standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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CHAPTER 3
VICTIMS OF CONSEQUENCE: EVIDENCE ON CHILD OUT-
COMES USINGMICRODATA FROM A CIVIL WAR
[WITH SAJALA PANDEY]
3.1 Introduction
Exposure to an armed conflict has detrimental effects on infants and children.
Existing literature in economics has documented the negative effects of vio-
lent events on child health (Akresh et al., 2012), child birthweight (Mansour
and Rees, 2012), height and cognitive skills (Duque, 2016), and long-run ed-
ucational achievements (Akresh, 2008). However, most studies seek to esti-
mate the causal effects of violent conflict either on the long-run educational
outcomes or short-run health outcomes like height and weight. Still, relatively
little is known about how short-run child time-allocation decisions, schooling
outcomes, and contemporaneous health-seeking behaviors are distorted due
to persistent violence.
In this chapter, we study the causal effects of violence on child time allo-
cation, curative health care, and education. In particular, we examine how
periods of heightened conflict during the Nepalese Civil War (1996-2206) affect
contemporaneous child labor and health care utilization decisions along with
short-run educational outcomes. As violence increases, parents are less likely
to send their children to school or take them to health facilities and more likely
to keep them home. Less time in school might translate to more time spent
at work (paid or unpaid) for these children. Coping with violence, therefore,
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disrupts education and curative health care of young children which can be
potentially damaging to their later-life outcomes.
Additionally, armed conflicts can have differential impacts on boys and
girls. Shemyakina (2011) finds that girls (but not boys) who were exposed to
Tajik armed conflict were less likely to complete mandatory schooling. Like-
wise, Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011) find that Guatemala’s 36-year-long
civil war affected the long-run education outcomes of Mayan females more
adversely than males. However, evidence on the gender disparity in the ef-
fects of armed conflict is mixed. Akresh (2008) finds strong negative effects
of the Rwandan genocide on the completed education of boys. In terms of
health outcomes, Akresh et al. (2012) find that both boys and girls who were
born during the 1998–2000 Eritrea–Ethiopia experienced similar negative im-
pacts on height-for-age Z-scores. There is also evidence of how conflict affects
children of certain age groups more than the others, even though the research
on this dimension remains limited. In two separate studies, Shemyakina (2011)
(for Tajik conflict) and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012) (for Colombian conflict)
find that violent events affected schooling outcomes of children aged 12 and
older.
The salient horrors of violence are obvious and anecdotal evidence on them
is widely available. However, the causal effect of armed-conflict on contempo-
raneous outcomes of children is difficult to measure as data and information
arrive haphazardly. The reason being that violent events prevent survey takers
from doing their jobs. In this situation of an “informational black hole”, the
Nepalese Civil War (1996-2006) provides an excellent setting to examine the
research questions. Firstly, this armed conflict did not deter ongoing surveys,
hence, allowing us to examine contemporaneous outcomes. Secondly, the na-
ture of thewar itself, where different parts of the country experienced a varying
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level of violent events overtime, provides us with the required geographical
and temporal variation to address our questions. The prolonged armed con-
flict between the Maoist and the government of Nepal initially began in the
Western part of the country as a small-scale anti-government protests. How-
ever, over time the conflict engulfed the entire country killing more than 13,000
people.
Our data on armed conflict comes from a unique database of victims from
the civil war which includes the date and the location of every war-related
event. We then merge this data with a nationally representative household
survey to access information on contemporaneous child-level outcomes during
the conflict. For identification, we exploit the spatial and temporal variation in
exposure to violence at local administrative levels.1 This gives us a setting for
a quasi-natural experiment to answer our research question.
We show that an increase in conflict-related violent events in the past 30
days increases the total hours worked by children aged 5 to 16. A one standard
deviation increase in exposure to conflict in a givenmonth increases total hours
worked by 4% of the sample mean. The estimated effects are especially sub-
stantial for the time allocated to agricultural work: a one standard deviation
in violence exposure increases hours worked in agriculture by roughly 8% of
the sample mean. The impact of violence on time allocated to work is largely
driven by the younger cohort (age 5-11) and boys.
As for health-seeking behavior, we find that violence does not make people
sicker but reduces the probability of visiting a health care facility for children
less than 16 years of age. This effect is non-negligible: a one standard deviation
increase in violent events in the past 30 days, decreases the likelihood of taking
a child to a health facility by roughly 6% of the sample mean. Unlike the neg-
1Local administrative levels include Village Development (VDCs) andMunicipalities which
are the second-lowest administrative units in Nepal.
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ative impact of conflict on time-allocation, the drop in curative care-seeking
behavior is driven by girls. The potential connection between child’s (labor)
productivity and sound health can be a reason why we do not observe a de-
crease in curative care for boys. Next, we focus on the educational outcomes of
children during the war. Exposure to violent events reduces the likelihood of
currently attending school and decreases years of education, in the short-run,
by approximately 1.5 months. The negative impact of violence on educational
achievements is significant for boys.
One of the potential mechanisms driving our contemporaneous outcomes
is that an increase in violent events changes parents’ perception of risk, hence,
altering their decisions related to children. This causal channel aligns with
the theoretical model provided by Estevan and Baland (2007). Their model
shows that when there is an increase in child mortality risk and parents are not
very altruistic, child labor increases whereas schooling decreases. An increase
in mortality risk hinders parents from truly internalizing the impact of child
labor on their children’s welfare. Therefore, they prefer immediate transfers
from their children in the form of child labor rather than risky investments
like education. The need for immediate transfer can also explain why violent
events negatively impact boys than girls. A larger portion of a child’s time
allocation is on a physically strenuous and arduous task like agricultural work
where the returns might be higher from boys. On health-seeking behavior, our
findings echo the results fromMolina (2016). She finds that local violence in the
Philippines reduced curative care utilization for children by their parents due
to avoidance behavior. Violence increases the risk of being victimized which
then translates to higher non-monetary costs of seeking health care.
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Related Literature and Contribution
This study is closely related to the literature in economics that studies the
effect of violence on child-level outcomes. Our findings relate well with those
of Akresh (2008) and Shemyakina (2011) who find negative effects of genocide
and armed conflict on educational achievements in Rwanda and Tajikistan, re-
spectively. We add to this literature by studying the contemporaneous effect
of violence on child time allocation and health-seeking behavior along with
schooling outcomes. As per our knowledge, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2012)
and Di Maio and Nandi (2013) are the only other two studies analyzing the ef-
fect of conflict on child-labor. Valente (2013) studies the causal effect of conflict
on education in Nepal but relies on district-level analysis. During the time of
conflict, Nepal had 75 districts and 3,915 villages within those districts. We,
on the other hand, exploit temporal variation in conflict across these villages
around the date of the survey and identify the effects of local-level violence.
The second strand of literature this study contributes to is the studies on the
relationship between violence and risk. Some experimental studies document
that exposure to violence can change one’s risk preferences (Brown et al., 2017;
Callen et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012). Households also adjust their production,
savings and labor supply decisions as a response to income risk caused by an
increase in violence (Bundervoet et al., 2006; Fernández et al., 2011). We add to
this literature by providing suggestive evidence for risk associated with fear of
victimization and mortality in the context of Nepal’s civil war.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we elaborate
on the Nepalese Civil War. In Section 3.3 we discuss the main data sources
that we use in the chapter. Section 3.5 lays out the empirical strategy. Section
3.6 presents results for the effect of violence on child time use, education, and
health-seeking behavior. Section 3.7 discusses potential channels and Section
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3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background
The Nepalese Civil War
On February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) for-
mally launched a rebellion against the government termed as the “People’s
War”. This resulted in a prolonged armed conflict between the CPN-M forces
and the government of Nepal that lasted until the Comprehensive Peace Ac-
cord was signed in 2006. During this period over 13,000 people were killed and
about 1,300 went missing (UN, 2012).2
Historically, Nepal was governed as an absolute monarchy. During the
early 1990s, Nepal transitioned to a constitutional monarchy, following a pro-
democracy movement – the Jana Andolan (“People’s Movement”) – that wit-
nessed the unification of various political parties towards the establishment
of a constitutional framework. The “People’s Movement” led to the establish-
ment of multiparty democracy and voting rights, and in November 1990, the
new constitution was drafted. This raised expectations of social progress, and
some historians believe that this was one of the factors that contributed to the
onset of internal conflict in 1996.
Shortly before the formal announcement of the “People’s War”, the CPN-M
submitted a 40-point demand to the Nepali Government that covered many
socioeconomic and political issues, and warned of a militant struggle that
would follow if those demands were not met. Over the course of the next
2Different sources provide different estimates for this figure. The government claims that
a total of 12,686 individuals were killed; although, since the State was actively involved in
killings during this period, the government has an incentive to under-report. While the Na-
tional Geographic Magazine also reports a similar figure as the government’s (Bendiksen and
Douglas, 2005), we identify 13,247 killings from our microdata.
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ten years, acts of violence and destruction, human rights abuses, and mass
killings by both, government forces and the CPN-M forces, were committed
across Nepal’s 75 districts.3 Appendix 3.A shows the general time-line of key
events during this civil war.
The CPN-M militia served under the leadership of a Chairman, who was
also the Supreme Commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which
was formed in September 2001. According to a UN (2012) report, the Maoist
militia had between 5,000 to 10,000 active combatants throughout the period
of conflict and towards the end had expanded to multiple divisions across the
country that was organized under three commands that were under the au-
thority of the Supreme Commands and four Deputy Commanders. The PLA’s
playbook included guerrilla attacks, and sabotage and propaganda actions,
such as random destruction and seizure of property (Shrestha, 1997). The hilly
terrains of Nepal allowed the PLA to easily carry out guerrilla type warfare.
Rural areas were more likely to be affected, at least during the initial phases of
the war.
Apart from the CPN-M militia, the government’s forces were also actively
involved during the conflict period to fight against the PLA. Initially, since the
conflict was seen as a minor threat, the Nepal Police (NP) was mobilized in
order to contain the insurgency. In 2001, the Armed Police Force of Nepal, a
paramilitary force, was set up in order to fight the insurgents due to the grow-
ing power of the Maoist forces. The Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) was not de-
ployed by the government until late 2001 citing that the insurgency was a law
and order problem that was to be addressed by the Nepal Police. Although
the government’s forces were to combat the insurgents, numerous acts of vi-
3With the exception of two districts – Manang and Mustang – all other districts wit-
nessed conflict-related killings. Manang and Mustangs districts are both high-altitude trans-
Himalayan regions and very sparsely populated.
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olence and unlawful killings were committed as a result of collateral damage
and chance encounters (UN, 2012). In particular the targets included those who
were alleged informants or perceived as sympathizers for a particular side.
Our microdata covers victims of violence from both sides of the conflict.
3.3 Data
Our data primarily comes from three independent sources: (i) the Informal
Sector Service Center (INSEC)microdata on victims from conflict, (ii) the Nepal
Living Standards Survey, and (iii) the National Population Census.
3.3.1 Microdata on Civil War
The data on victims from the Nepalese Civil War was collected by the Infor-
mal Sector Service Center (INSEC), a non-governmental organization based in
Nepal that works on human rights issues.4 This data was compiled from quali-
tative records from investigations of international human rights violations and
international humanitarian law violations during the ten-year insurgency and
are cross-referenced in the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner’s Nepal Conflict Archive.5 The data maintained by INSEC has
been used in previous studies, like those by Do and Iyer (2010)6 and Shrestha
(2017), and is, as per our knowledge, the most reliable and impartial database
on conflict intensity during the civil war. It is also unique in nature since it is a
census of a known population of victims from the war. The unit of observation
4This database is unique in that it is a census of victims from domestic conflict and is com-
piled by an impartial entity–Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC). This is important since
both the Nepali government and the Maoist forces were actively involved in killings and acts
of violence throughout this period. It is only reasonable to suspect that if the government were
to build a similar database, it would necessarily try to underplay its role in the civil war.
5http://nepalconflictreport.ohchr.org
6I use geographically granular data on conflict than this study.
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is an individual victim. The data also provides information on whether the vic-
tim was killed, injured, or disappeared along with information on the location
and the exact date of the violent event.
The INSEC data reports 14,959 fatalities, of which 13,247 were killings, 932
were disappearances, and 780 were instances when the victim sustained dis-
ability inducing injuries.7 By construction the data excludes acts of violence
where people were not killed or injured, or did not disappear. For instance, if
a building was torched and nobody was affected, our data would not record
such an incident. To this extent, our data includes only victimization from con-
flict and not a broader set of threat to property and life due to conflict. Due
to the rich temporal and spatial information in the data, we are able exploit
variation along these dimensions in order to identify the effect of risk due to
violence on economic decisions.
Figures 3.1 depicts the three major outcomes of violent events (killed, dis-
appeared, or injured). More than half the number of deaths were caused by
the government’s forces. Figure 3.2(a) summarizes the distribution of deaths
throughout the conflict by the perpetrator (State, Maoist, and Others). This
data also captures the delayed involvement of the Nepali government’s forces
in the civil war. Specifically, after 2001, once the army was deployed, the num-
ber of deaths due to the State were strikingly higher than those caused by the
Maoists. Figure 3.2(b) depicts the causes of these deaths as recorded in the IN-
SEC database. Out of all the deaths that occurred during this war, 30% were
due to combat fighting whereas the remaining of the victims died in a non-
combat setting. The majority of the deaths in the non-combat setting was due
to extra-judicial killing perpetrated by the state.
7Authors’ calculation.
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Spatial and Temporal Variation in Conflict
Figure 3.3 shows district-level spatial and temporal variation in conflict-
related events from the start of this war to its end. Violent events first started
in districts like Rukum and Rolpa and slowly started spreading in neighboring
districts with varying and greater intensity (as it goes from lighter to darker
shades). Here, for each individual map, we define intensity as conflict-related
events (deaths, killing or disappearances) per 1000 population within a district
for the given time frame. Although this district-level breakdown of conflict in-
tensity provides information on the geographical spread of conflict across time,
our analysis actually uses Village Development Committees (VDCs) and mu-
nicipality level analysis. VDCs and municipalities are the second-lowest ad-
ministrative units and collections of these VDCs and few municipalities make
up a district. Focusing on smaller administrative units allows conflict to be lo-
cal enough to influence decision making. Figure 3.B.1 in Appendix 3.B shows
all the villages marked in red for which some kind of conflict-related event has
been recorded in the INSEC data. Out of 3915 Village Development Commit-
tees (VDCs) and municipalities8, the conflict data records some violent events
for 2427 of them. This spatial and temporal variation in conflict across local
level administrative units is what we intend to exploit in this study.
In order to illustrate the variation in conflict intensity across time and space,
we plot the standard deviation of the number of violent events per thousand
population across time and space (district level). Figure 3.4 plots the cross-
sectional standard deviation for all districts across time (1996-2006) and Figure
3.5 plots the standard deviation for each district across time. As can be seen in
Figure 3.4, with reference to the time-line of events in Appendix 3.A, the period
immediately after the army was employed in November 2001 until the second
8VDCs (rural) and municipalities (urban)are the second-lowest administrative units in
Nepal. Collection of VDCs and municipalities make up a district
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round of peace talks began in January 2003, witnessed an increased number of
killings across the country. There were however regions that witnessed rela-
tively low levels of violence even during the peak of the war. Taken together,
these two figures show the variation that we exploit in order to identify he
causal effects of violence on household decisions on issues related to children.9
3.3.2 Nepal Living Standards Survey
To study the impact of violence on the household’s economic decisions such
as education, labor and time allocation, and health care of children, we use
data from the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), otherwise known
as the Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS). This is a multi-topic represen-
tative household survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)
and is available for the periods of 1995-96, 2003-04, and 2010-11. The survey
is a cross-section that covers a broad range of household-level topics includ-
ing consumption, income, labor markets, education, and health. Our outcome
variables and bulk of control variables are taken from the NLSS, 2003-04 as the
time of the survey falls within the conflict period allowing us to assess contem-
poraneous decision making during the time of armed conflict.
3.3.3 Population Census of Nepal
To weight our victim-level data by village-level population, we use the Na-
tional Population Census of 2001. In order to distinguish between densely
populated villages with a lot of violent events and sparsely populated regions
with few deaths, our weighting technique is crucial in understanding the dif-
ferential effect of conflict intensity across time and space.
9While doing so we are obviously restricted by the time-line of other surveys and the nature
of questions in those surveys.
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3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on our variables of interest and controls.
Panel A of the table provides the descriptive statistics for children’s time spent
in work each week. On average, children of ages between 5 to 16 worked for
10.8 hours per week. This involves working in wage/non-wage market activ-
ities within or outside the household, agricultural work, or domestic chores.
The variation in total hours worked is also high at 17.6 hours per week. A
larger amount of time is allocated to agricultural work where children spent
an average of 6.3 hours per week. The NLSS also provides information on
how many hours these children worked in a year. The mean hours worked in
activities outside schooling per year is equal to 426.3 hours.
Though the decision to obtain an education is a dynamic process, the NLSS
has information on only final education outcomes observed at the time of the
survey. Unlike time allocation in other activities, this survey does not report the
number of hours dedicated to schooling per week. For education, we focus on
ages 6 and above as Nepal’s Education Act of 1971 10 suggested the minimum
age for primary school enrollment to be 6 years. Panel B of Table 3.1 reports
the mean and standard deviation of educational outcomes of children aged 6
to 16 during the time of the survey. 80 percent of children reported having
been ever enrolled and currently attending school. A large number of children
are not in appropriate grade for their age. On average, 70 percent of current
school-going children are over-age for the grades they are attending. Finally,
the mean number of years of education for this age group is at 5.2 years.
Panel C of 3.1 reports summary statistics on health-seeking behavior for
10The first amendment of this Act was in July 2003. However, NLSS survey had already be-
gun by then and the school year had already started for the amendment to have an immediate
impact.
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children of ages between 0 to 16. Only 8 percent of the children were taken
to health services in the past 30 days to seek any curative health care. Fifty
percent of children are female and eighty percent of them are from rural loca-
tions. The average number of years of education of household head is 3.9 years
whereas that of the mother is of 1.8 years only.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
3.5.1 Specification
Since we are interested in contemporaneous and short-run outcomes, we ex-
ploit conflict around the date of the NLSS survey for each individual. We
estimate the following specification: for outcome yivt of child i, living in vil-
lage/municipality v and surveyed at date t11, we have
yivt “ b0 ` b1 Intensityivt ` X1ivG` dm ` dy ` aps ` #ivt (3.1)
where Intensityivt is a measure of conflict intensity that child i was exposed
to in village v up to the date of the survey t. The construction of conflict in-
tensity is outcome variable specific. For contemporaneous outcomes like time
allocation and curative health care seeking, our goal is to understand if local-
level conflict around the time of the survey has any causal impact. In this case,
Intensityivt is calculated as the total number of conflict-related events in the
past 30 days up to the date of the survey per 1000 population in a village or a
municipality. As mentioned earlier, unlike time allocation outcomes, the NLSS
provides information only on the final educational outcomes of the children
reported at the time of the survey. Therefore, for impacts on short-run edu-
cational outcomes, Intensityivt is measured as the sum of the total number of
11Date includes day d, of month m of year y
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violent events per 1000 population a child was exposed to since her birth (if
born after 1996) or after the start of the civil war in 1996 (for those born before
1996) up to the date of the survey.
TheNLSS survey spans over a period of more than one year. However, there
is a limited variation in the date of survey of households within the same vil-
lage or municipality and inclusion of local level fixed effects will drive away all
the variation that we intend to exploit. Therefore, we include district-specific
stratum fixed effects denoted by aps. District is a larger administrative area
which includes several villages and municipalities. At the time of the survey,
Nepal had 75 districts and 3,915 villages or municipalities within those dis-
tricts. Stratum here takes care of the ecological and topographical division of
villages and municipalities. Xiv are a set of individual, household and village
level controls such as the age of the child, gender, mother’s education, house-
hold head’s education, household size, household wealth, village-level popu-
lation, and total time taken to primary school or nearest health facility. We also
control for ethnicity fixed effects. dm and dy are month and year of survey fixed
effects. The coefficient of interest, b1, measures the effect of a unit increase in
conflict exposure on the outcome variable of interest. eivt is the error term of
the regression model. Finally, we estimate all regressions using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) and cluster standard errors at the village or municipality level.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Child Time Allocation and Labor
When the number of violent events in a locality increases, parents might de-
cide to keep their children home and involve them in household work or other
activities like agriculture. Spending more time in economic work or domes-
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tic chores by children due to ongoing conflict translates to a reduction in time
allocated to studying or leisure.
Our source for the time use data is the NLSS-2003 survey which records
hours per week or per year dedicated by children (aged 5-16) to various activ-
ities outside schooling. This allows us to analyze if local-level conflict in the
past 30 days or 12 months from the date of the survey (for the latter measure
of time use) had any contemporaneous effect on a child’s time allocation and
labor supply. Our measure of conflict intensity (Intensityivt) variable as shown in
equation 3.1 is calculated as the total number of conflict-related events in the past 30
days (or 12 months) up to the date of survey per 1000 population in a village or a
municipality. The first two rows of Table 3.2 present summary statistics for our
measure of conflict intensity used to analyze impacts on time allocation. The
mean of conflict intensity in the past 30 days and is 0.02 with a standard devi-
ation of 0.1 whereas the average conflict intensity in the past 12 months is 0.2
with a standard deviation of 0.6.
Table 3.3 reports the coefficient estimates from equation 3.1 for time use of
children in past 7 days. Column 1 of Panel A shows the results for the entire
sample of children aged 5-16. We find that a one standard deviation increase
in conflict intensity in the past 30 days, which is 0.1 (Table 3.2), increases total
hours worked in a week by 4.205ˆ 0.1 “ 0.4205 hours which is roughly 4% of
the sample mean. This effect is significant and largely driven by an increase of
approximately 7.4% of the sample mean in the total hours worked by younger
children aged 5 to 11 (Column 2 of Panel A). Panels B and C of Columns 1 and
2 present results for effects on total hours worked for female andmale samples,
respectively. The increase in total hours for all children aged 5 to 16 is driven
by an increase in working hours of boys belonging to both younger (age 5 to
11) and older (age 12 to 16) age-cohorts. For girls, there is a significant increase
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in total hours worked only for the younger cohort.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.3 present the results for the contemporaneous
effect of exposure to violence on time allocated to agricultural work. A stan-
dard deviation increase in conflict intensity in the past month increases time
dedicated to agriculture for children of ages 5 to 16 by 5.340 ˚ 0.1 “ 0.534 hours
which is roughly 8.4% of the sample mean. The magnitude of the effect on time
dedicated to agriculture is larger for the younger cohort (approximately 15% of
the sample mean). As seen in Columns 4-6 of Panel C, these results are driven
by an increase in the time allocated by boys belonging to both younger and
older cohorts. Whereas for girls (Columns 4-6 of Panel B) a significant increase
in agricultural work due to recent violence is observed only for the younger
cohort of ages 5 to 11. The coefficients hours spent in domestic activities are
negative but very small in magnitude with no statistical significance. 12
3.6.2 Health
Curative Health Seeking Behavior
Our next goal is to understand if conflict-related events in the past 30 days
affect parents’ decision to seek any health care for their children less than 16
years of age. We focus on health-seeking behavior because a lack of proper
health care, especially in developing countries, can be detrimental to children,
the effect of which can last into adulthood. Access to proper health care can
also improve school attendance and performance. Additionally, a larger por-
12Table 3.C.1 reports estimates for 3.1 when the outcome variable is hours worked in past
12 months. For this estimation, our measure of conflict intensity (Intensityivt) is the total number
of violent events per thousand population in a village or a municipality in the past 12 months of the
date of the survey. An increase in conflict intensity does not have a significant impact on total
hours worked. The only exception is the older male cohort for which the effect is significant
and positive. However, we do find a significant effect on hours worked in agricultural work.
A one standard deviation increase in conflict in the past 12 months, which is 0.6 (Table 3.2)
increases yearly time allocated to agricultural work by 56.329 ˆ 0.6 “ 33.8 hours which is
roughly 14.4% of the mean. This impact is significant (in comparison to the sample mean) for
both boys and girls belonging to the younger cohort.
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tion of a child’s time allocation is on arduous agricultural work, collecting wa-
ter or firewood. In this case, parents might have a greater incentive to seek-
ing curative health care of children to improve their productivity in physically
strenuous activities.
Table 3.4 presents estimates for equation 3.1 where the outcome variable is
a dummy that takes value 1 if the survey respondent reported that any health
care was sought for the child in past 30 days. As seen in Column 1 of Panel
A, conflict intensity is negatively associated with health care. A one standard
deviation increase in conflict in the past 30 days, decreases the likelihood of
taking a child of age between 0-16 to a health facility by ´0.052ˆ 0.1 “ 0.0052
points which is 6.11 % of the sample mean. This drop is significant and nega-
tive for children of age cohort 5 to 16 by ´0.034ˆ 0.1 “ 0.0034 points which is
roughly 6.3% of the sample mean. The drop in the probability of seeking cura-
tive care is driven by the negative impact of recent conflict on health-seeking
for female children as observed in Panel B. A standard deviation increase in
conflict intensity reduces the probability of going to a health facility for girls
´0.080ˆ 0.1 “ 0.0080 points which is roughly 16% of the sample mean. Girls
of age group 5 to 11 are also significantly impacted by recent violence. We do
not find evidence for any significant effect of conflict on curative health care
seeking of boys.
The NLSS survey records the answer to whether a child was taken to a
health facility if only she was reported to be ill in the past 30 days. Following
Molina (2016), we assigned a zero to those children who were not reported to
be sick while creating the outcome variable in Table 3.4. This is consistent with
this variable being an indicator of curative care-seeking and not health-care
utilization after being sick. To check if conflict affects sick children differently,
we run the estimation only for sick children. The results of this estimation
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are presented in Table 3.5. Before we describe the results in detail, we limit this
analysis to sick children belonging to ages 16 or below. Conducting sub-sample
analysis of different age cohorts reduces our sample size by a lot resulting in
issues with the power of the test.
As seen in Column 1 of Table 3.5, an increase in conflict in the past 30
days negatively impacts curative health care seeking but we fail to find any
statistical significance. However, when we analyze female and male sam-
ples separately, we find a negative association of conflict with curative health
care seeking for sick girls. A standard deviation increase in conflict inten-
sity decreases the probability of being taken to health facility for sick girls by
´0.863ˆ 0.1 “ 0.0863 or 8.63 percentage points. This decrease in the probabil-
ity is roughly 13.4% of the sample mean. The result for sick boys is, however,
the complete opposite. As conflict increases by one standard deviation, cura-
tive health care seeking for male children increases by 0.0493 or 4.93 percent-
age points, which is 7% of the sample mean. Parents prefer to take sick boys to
health facilities during times of conflict because these periods are also marked
by an increase in their labor supply. The potential connection between a child’s
productivity and sound health might be a motivating factor for this increase in
the likelihood of health care utilization for sick male children.
Does conflict make children sick?
However, the effect of conflict can be two-fold: 1) as discussed above, it
can prevent parents’ from seeking health-care for their children, which in turn
might deteriorate their health, 2) conflict can itself make children sicker. There-
fore, to understand the effect of violence on health-seeking behavior, it is cru-
cial to know if conflict itself is making children sicker. NLSS survey asks re-
spondents questions on the exact date of when they last fell sick and for each
village, we have information on the number of conflict-related events for each
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day from 1996-2006. Using this information we create an artificial unbalanced
village-level panel. To do this, for each reported date of sickness, we sum up
all respondents of the same village who fell sick on that particular day. We then
estimate the following panel regression:
Sjt “ b1 ` b2 Intensityjt ` dj ` at ` ejt (3.2)
where Sjt is the number of children (age 0-16) in a village jwho reported being
sick on date t. Intensityjt is is a measure of conflict intensity calculated by
adding the total number of conflict-related events in the past 30 days up to the
date of reported illness weighted by the population of the village times 1000.
We also include village and date of illness fixed effects, dj and at, respectively
and cluster the standard errors are at the village level.
Table 3.6 shows the results for the panel estimation as seen in equation 3.2.
Conflict intensity in the past 30 days of the date of reported illness has no sig-
nificant effect on the number of children reported being sick. The statistical
insignificance of the coefficient estimates remains when we run the specifica-
tion for boys and girls separately. Therefore, conflict does not make children
sick, rather the channel it operates by is affecting healthcare-seeking behavior.
3.6.3 Education
An increase in hours worked on other activities immediately after a period of
violent conflict raises the question of whether this leads to a decrease in the
time allocated to schooling. Unfortunately, the NLSS does not have any in-
formation on hours spent in schooling but only on final educational outcomes
observed at the time of the survey. As a result of which, we summed up the total
number of violent events a child was exposed to since her birth (if born after 1996) or
after the start of the civil war in 1996 (for those born before 1996) up to the date of
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the survey to calculate the number of violent events per thousand population (conflict
intensity, Intensityivdmy). The summary statistics for this measure of conflict in-
tensity can be found in the third row of Table 3.2. On average, children were
exposed to 0.6 violent events per thousand population with a standard devia-
tion of 2.3. The maximum exposure is at 41.8 events per 1000 population.
As mentioned earlier, the minimum age for primary schooling in 2003 was
6 years old. Therefore, the only cohort born after the civil war that we can in-
clude in our analysis is those who were born in the year 1997. Since, children
aged 7-16 at the time of the survey were born in 1996 or before, there is very
little variation in conflict intensity across birth year cohorts within the same
village. Therefore, we follow our baseline specification of equation 3.1 to in-
clude only year and month of the survey, and stratum varying district fixed
effects.
Enrollment
Violent events due to armed conflict would have affected parents’ decisions
to enroll their children in primary schools. The age group whose enrollment
was affected by the war includes children who were of 6 years or below in 1996
(13 years and below in 2003) or those who were born after 1996. We do not ob-
serve these children after 2003 and hence do not know their long term school
enrollment outcome. However, we can assess whether exposure to conflict im-
pacted their likelihood of ever being enrolled in primary school. This effect
on enrollment can be considered as the short-run effects of conflict. Because
the official age to start primary school was 6 years in Nepal, we study the ef-
fect of conflict in the probability of ever being enrolled during the wartime of
students aged 6 to 13 in 2003. Column 1 of Table 3.7 presents results for this
estimation. The outcome variable takes value 1 if a child was ever enrolled
in school. Though the sign of the coefficient on Panel A of Column 1 is nega-
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tive, it is very small in magnitude and we fail to find any significant effect on
enrollment.
Currently Attending
The enrollment variable above does not tell us whether the child was out of
school at the time of the survey or had to drop out. A childmight have been en-
rolled in school at some point in time but might not be currently attending due
to a violent situation. Columns 2-5 of Table 3.7 present estimates for an out-
come variable “Currently Attending" which takes value 1 if a child is reported
to be attending school at the time of the survey. Panel A of column 1 shows that
exposure to the conflict has a negative and significant effect on the probability
of currently attending school for children who are of ages 6 to 16. However, the
magnitude of this effect on education is smaller compared to the effects on la-
bor hours. A one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity, which is 2.3
(Table 3.2), leads to a decrease in the likelihood of currently attending school
by 0.005ˆ 2.3 “ 0.0115 or 1.15 percentage points - approximately 1.45 percent
of the sample mean. For a highly exposed child (conflict intensity of 41.8), this
drop is nearly 27% of the sample mean. This result is largely driven by the
older cohort of ages 12 to 16, as seen in Column 4 of Panel A.
Columns 2-4 of Panel C present results for this estimation for boys. As
observed in Column 2, the drop in the likelihood of currently attending
school due to being exposed to conflict is negative and highly significant for
boys. A standard deviation increase in conflict decreases this probability by
0.006ˆ2.3 “ 0.0138 or 1.38 percentage points, which is nearly 1.67% of the sam-
ple mean. We observe a significant drop in the likelihood of attending school
for both younger (age 6 to 11) and older (age 12 to 16) boys. This result is in line
with the effect of conflict on child time allocation and labor hours worked (Sec-
tion 3.6.1) where results were largely driven by an increase in hours worked by
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male children.
Over-age
Conflict increases the likelihood of delay enrollment in primary school, ab-
senteeism in school, missed exams, and closure of schools leading to grade
repetition. Even though we do not have direct measures for these variables,
we can study whether conflict affects the probability of students being in the
appropriate grade for their age. We limit our sample to students who are of 6-
16 years of age in 2003 and currently attending school. Columns 5 to 7 of Table
3.7 report the results for equation 3.1 where the outcome is an indicator for a
child currently being below the grade she is supposed to be for her age - that is,
if her age is greater than the nationally determined age for that grade. As seen
in Panel B, for the entire sample of children, an increase in conflict intensity
increases the probability of being overage for older (age 12 to 16) children.
However, as seen in, Columns 5-7 of Panel C, when we run the specification
for boys the results are positive in sign and highly significant. A standard
deviation increase in conflict intensity increases the likelihood of being over-
age for boys (Column 5) by 0.007 ˆ 2.3 “ 0.0161 or 1.61 percentage points,
which is nearly 2.25% of the sample mean. Though we observe this increase
for both younger and older cohorts, the magnitude of the effect is larger for
the former group. For younger boys (Column 6), a standard deviation increase
in conflict increases the probability of being over-age by 0.010 ˆ 2.3 “ 0.023
which is roughly 4% of the sample mean for this cohort.
Surprisingly, for girls of ages 6 to 16 (Column 5 of Panel B), an increase in
conflict intensity reduces their probability of being over-age and this effect is
driven by the younger girls.
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Years of education
Next, we study whether conflict affected the number of years of education
of children. We study children below the age of 16 at the time of the survey and
hence, can only analyze the short-run effects of conflict on educational achieve-
ment. Table 3.8 reports estimates for years of education. As observed in Panel
A, a one standard deviation increase in conflict intensity decreases years of ed-
ucation of exposed children by 0.031ˆ 2.3 “ 0.0713 years or approximately by
a month. This estimate is only 0.6% of the sample mean. This result is largely
driven by the drop in the years of education of boys, as observed in Panel C. A
standard deviation increase in conflict intensity reduces years of education of
boys by 0.055ˆ 2.3 “ 0.1265, i.e., roughly by almost 1.5 months.
3.6.4 Potential Threat to Identification
Exogeneity of Violent Events
Numerous studies put conflict on the left-hand side of an equation that con-
sists of demographic characteristics, resources, geographic and political con-
ditions on the right-hand side in an attempt to provide explanations for when
and why conflict arises in a particular setting, between two or more groups.
This literature has explored and found various determinants of conflict such
as, the presence of natural resources and ‘lootable wealth’ (Weinstein, 2006;
Ross, 2004, 2006; Adhvaryu et al., 2018), international aid (De Ree andNillesen,
2009; Nunn and Qian, 2014; Crost et al., 2014), arbitrary national boundaries
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), inequality and ethnic cleavages (Ce-
derman et al., 2013, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Esteban et al., 2012),
the opportunity cost of conflict (Miguel et al., 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013), the
lack of political accountability and democracy (Skrede Gleditsch and Ruggeri,
2010) and other types of exploitative institutions (Richards, 1996; Wood, 2003).
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While conflict, in and of itself, may never be fully exogenous, we test for valid
concerns that may prove as a threat to our identification strategy.
As a first pass, we run the following specification to test for consistent
month, year, district effects:
Intensityjt “ b0 ` b1 pmonthtq ` b2 pyearq ` b1 pdistrictjq ` # jt (3.3)
where we test for the presence of consistent month, year, and district-
specific effects. We then plot the residuals from this regression along with the
number of victims due to conflict across time in Figure 3.6 andwe see that these
residuals almost perfectly align with the number of victims from conflict. This
shows that unobservable time and district level characteristics are not affecting
our results.
3.7 Mechanism
One of the potential mechanisms driving our contemporaneous outcomes is
that an increase in violent events changes parents’ perception of risk, hence,
altering their decisions related to children. This causal channel aligns with the
theoretical model provided by Estevan and Baland (2007). Their model shows
that when there is an increase in child mortality risk and parents are not very
altruistic, child labor increases whereas schooling decreases. An increase in
mortality risk hinders parents from truly internalizing the impact of child la-
bor on their children’s welfare. Therefore, they prefer immediate transfers from
their children in the form of child labor rather than risky investments like ed-
ucation. The need for immediate transfer can also explain why violent events
negatively impact boys than girls. Larger portion of a child’s time allocation
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is on a physically strenuous and arduous task like agricultural work where
the returns might be higher from boys. On health-seeking behavior, our find-
ings echo the results from Molina (2016). She finds that local violence in the
Philippines reduced curative care utilization for children by their parents due
to avoidance behavior. Violence increases the risk of being victimized which
then translates to higher non-monetary costs of seeking health care.
Valente (2013) reports finding positive effects of Nepal’s civil war on the
education of girls with no significant impact on the educational achievements
of boys. She argues that the positive effect on female educational attainment
might be due to change in societal attitude toward female schooling and the
Maoist policy13 of coercing parents to send their daughters to school. Though
our results do not find a significant impact of conflict on the educational
achievements of girls, we do find that girls are more likely to be in the grade
appropriate to their age. Maoist’s motto of a more equitable society might be
one of the potential channels driving our results on education.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper intends to document the effects of violent events on short-run eco-
nomic decisions and outcomes. We focus on aspects of human capital accu-
mulation, such as education, and health, and child’s time use. Using micro-
data from a unique database of violent events we find that during the periods
of heightened violence, parents are more likely to involve their children, es-
pecially boys, in work-related activities. Conflict-related events also hamper
education of boys. However, increase in violence reduces curative-care seek-
ing for girls rather than boys. The potential connection between a boy’s pro-
ductivity at arduous tasks like agricultural work and sound health might be a
13Although there are several anecdotal evidence of Maoist’s policy disrupting schooling.
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motivating factor in play here.
So far we have not been able to perfectly disentangle whether the forces of
demand or supply are at work, but this is something we are interested in doing
for future work. One could think of violence as an imposition of a tax to every-
day economic activity and this tax could distort both the supply and demand
side. Alternatively, in the long run, one could think of violence affecting pref-
erences as well. To disentangle whether violence affects prices or preferences,
we may need a structural model that poses some testable implications of the
effects of an increase in risk.
Finally, whether these short-run effects have long-run consequences is a
valid question. This is the second, and more interesting, question that we wish
to answer in future work. Are individuals who have invested less in education
due to the risk of violence worse off, and if so, do they have worse labor market
outcomes in the future? Are children who have not been provided proper cura-
tive care in the early stages of life worse off on their later life outcomes? Some
of these questions are answered in Pandey (2020) by analyzing the long-run
implications of exposure to conflict in childhood. Others we leave for future
research.
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Outcome of incident by perpetrator
Notes: In the figure above, we plot the outcomes (killed, disappeared, and injured) of violent
events by perpetrator of respective incidence.
(a) Number of Deaths
by Perpetrator
(b) Cause of Death
Figure 3.2: Number of Victims: by perpetrator and by cause of death
Notes: Figure (a) plots the total number of deaths each year by perpetrator. Figure (b) plots the
cause of death by perpetrator. In this figure, serious nature deaths were caused by heinous
killings that involved prolonged torture of the victim by the perpetrator.
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Figure 3.3: Conflict Intensity: 1996–2006
(a) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (b) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts in 1996 districts from 1996-98
(c) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (d) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts from 1996-00 districts from 1996-02
(e) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by (f) Conflict Intensity (cumulated) by
districts from 1996-04 districts from 1996-06
Notes: The maps above show the spread of Nepalese Civil War (in terms of conflict intensity) from 1996-2006. Conflict inten-
sity is measured as the number of cumulated conflict related victims from 1996 to year on the figure per thousand population
within a district. Although this district level breakdown of conflict intensity provides information on geographical spread of
conflict across time, my analysis actually uses VDCs and municipalities (second lowest administrative unit) level analysis.
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Figure 3.4: Spatial Variation in Conflict Intensity (across time)
Notes: In the graph above, for each time period, we provide the standard deviation in conflict
exposure across districts. Conflict exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000
population.
Figure 3.5: Temporal Variation in Conflict Intensity (across districts)
Notes: In the box plot above, we provide the standard deviation in conflict exposure across
different time period. Conflict exposure (intensity) is measured as casualties/1000
population.
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Figure 3.6: Test for Exogeneity of Conflict
Notes: In the figure above, we plot the residuals of the regression of conflict intensity on
month, year, and district fixed effects.
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3.10 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD N
Panel A: Time Allocation Outcomes (Age 5-16)
Total hrs worked in past 7 days in:
all activities 10.8 17.6 7791
agriculture 6.3 13.2 7791
domestic work 3.6 8.5 7791
Total hrs worked in past 12 months in:
all activities 426.3 724.0 7791
agriculture 234.7 500.1 7791
domestic work 159.4 379.9 7791
Panel B: Education Outcomes (Age 6-16)
(Ever enrolled) 0.8 0.4 7106
(Currently attending school) 0.8 0.4 7104
(Over-age for the grade) 0.7 0.5 5479
Education (years) 5.2 3.4 7106
Time taken to primary school (minutes) 17.0 23.7 7106
Panel C: Health Care Outcomes (Age 0-16)
(Any curative care) 0.08 0.3 10914
Time taken to health facility (minutes) 46.9 67.8 10914
Panel D: Other Variables (Age 5-16)
Female 0.5 0.5 7791
Child’s age 10.4 3.4 7791
Rural location 0.8 0.4 7791
HH head’s education (years) 3.9 5.0 7791
Mother’s education (years) 1.8 3.8 7790
Household’s size 7.0 3.1 7791
Wealth 12.8 1.3 7791
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for NLSS (2003) data. Panel A reports the summary statistics for
time allocation outcomes. Total hours is a continuous variable and it is the total sum of time spent in different activities outside
schooling in the past 7 days. Panel B reports the summary statistics for educational outcomes. Ever enrolled is an indicator
for whether the child has been ever enrolled in school upto the time of the survey. Panel C report the summary statistics for
health-seeking behavior where Any curative care is an indicator for if the child was taken to a health service facility in the past
30 days. Wealth in Panel D is the log of total assets owned by the household.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Conflict
Mean SD Min Max
Total no. of deaths/1000 population:
in past 30 days 0.02 0.10 0 1.3
in past 12 months 0.2 0.6 0 7.9
from birth to survey date 0.6 2.3 0 41.8
Notes: The table above provides mean and standard deviation for conflict intensity. Conflict exposure denotes no. casual-
ties/1000 population in a village/municipality in past 30 days, past 12 months, and from birth of a child to the date of the
survey, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Effect of exposure to conflict on curative health care seeking
Any curative health care
0 to 16 0 to 4 5 to 16 5 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.052˚˚ -0.085 -0.034˚˚ -0.047˚˚ -0.014
(0.022) (0.063) (0.013) (0.021) (0.031)
Obs. 10912 3120 7792 4607 3185
Mean Outcome. 0.085 0.161 0.054 0.061 0.045
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict -0.082˚ -0.106 -0.080˚˚ -0.072˚˚ -0.103
(0.042) (0.104) (0.034) (0.036) (0.067)
Obs. 5377 1554 3823 2271 1552
Mean Outcome. 0.076 0.140 0.049 0.055 0.042
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.023 -0.090 0.018 -0.014 0.048
(0.032) (0.077) (0.037) (0.062) (0.035)
Obs. 5535 1566 3969 2336 1633
Mean Outcome. 0.094 0.182 0.059 0.067 0.048
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients (b1) from specification 3.1. Conflict denotes casualties/1000 popula-
tion in a village or a municipality in the past 30 days. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell
represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls include: child’s gender, and age, ru-
ral or urban region, education of the household health and mother, household size, wealth, time taken to health service center
and village level population. The outcome of interest is an indicator that takes value 1 if any curative care was sought for the
child. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel B & C show results for female and male sub-sample, respectively. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 3.5: Effect of exposure to conflict on health care
utilization
Any curative health care (Sick only),
Age 0-16
All Sample Female Male
[1] [2] [3]
Conflict -0.008 -0.863˚˚ 0.493˚˚˚
(0.181) (0.396) (0.177)
Obs. 1372 632 740
Mean Outcome. 0.676 0.644 0.703
Disease, Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity &
District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients (b1) from specification 3.1.
Conflict denotes casualties/1000 population in a village or a municipality in the past
30 days. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell rep-
resents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls
include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household
health and mother, household size, wealth, time taken to health service center and vil-
lage level population. The outcome of interest is an indicator that takes value 1 if any
curative care was sought for the child. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & *
Significant at 10% level of significance.
Table 3.6: Effect of exposure to conflict on number of
children reported sick
Number of sick children aged 0-16
All Sample Female Male
[1] [2] [3]
Conflict 0.024 0.014 0.029
(0.022) (0.026) (0.032)
Obs. 4740 2422 2536
Mean Outcome. 1.101 1.052 1.053
Date and Location Fixed Effects
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients (b1) from specification 3.2.
Conflict denotes casualties/1000 population in a village or a municipality in the past
30 days of reported date of sickness. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or munic-
ipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are
estimated using OLS. The outcome of interest is total number of sick children reported
in a particular date in a village or municipality. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at
5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 3.7: Effect of exposure to conflict on educational status
Ever
Enrolled Currently Attending Over Age
6 to 13 6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16 6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.001 -0.005˚˚ -0.003 -0.007˚˚˚ -0.000 -0.001 0.003˚
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs. 5264 7103 3929 3174 5478 3205 2273
Mean Outcome. 0.841 0.776 0.818 0.725 0.707 0.607 0.846
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.023 -0.011˚˚˚ -0.009˚ 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017)
Obs. 2549 3467 1920 1547 2434 1458 976
Mean Outcome. 0.785 0.708 0.763 0.641 0.697 0.599 0.842
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.002 -0.006˚˚˚ -0.004˚ -0.008˚˚˚ 0.007˚˚˚ 0.010˚˚ 0.006˚˚˚
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Obs. 2715 3636 2009 1627 3044 1747 1297
Mean Outcome. 0.893 0.841 0.871 0.805 0.715 0.614 0.850
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients (b1) from specification 3.1. Conflict denotes total number of deaths per 1000
population in the village or municipality of residence that the child is ever exposed to until the date of survey. Standard errors are
clustered by VDC or municipality of birth. Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS.
Controls include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household health and mother, household size, wealth,
time taken to primary school and village level population. Currently attending is an indicator of whether the child is attending school
during the time of the survey. Over age take value 1 if the child’s age is greater than the recommended age for the class s/he is currently
attending. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel B & C show results for female and male sub-sample, respectively. ***
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant at 10% level of significance.
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Table 3.8: Effect of exposure to conflict on years of education
Years of Education
6 to 16 6 to 11 12 to 16
[1] [2] [3]
Panel A: All Sample
Conflict -0.031˚˚˚ -0.013 -0.064˚˚˚
(0.012) (0.009) (0.022)
Obs. 7104 3930 3174
Mean Outcome. 5.198 3.787 6.946
Panel B: Female Only
Conflict -0.004 0.019 -0.149
(0.018) (0.015) (0.139)
Obs. 3468 1921 1547
Mean Outcome. 4.739 3.506 6.271
Panel C: Male Only
Conflict -0.055˚˚˚ -0.047˚˚˚ -0.073˚˚˚
(0.013) (0.010) (0.025)
Obs. 3636 2009 1627
Mean Outcome. 5.635 4.055 7.586
Survey Year and Month, Ethnicity & District X Stratum Fixed Effects & Controls
Notes: The table above reports the estimated coefficients (b1) from specification 3.1. Conflict denotes
total number of deaths per 1000 population in the village or municipality of residence that the child is
ever exposed to until the date of survey. Standard errors are clustered by VDC or municipality of birth.
Each cell represents result from different regression. The results are estimated using OLS. Controls
include: child’s gender, and age, rural or urban region, education of the household health and mother,
household size, wealth, time taken to primary school and village level population. The outcome of
interest is total years of education. Panel A presents results for entire sample. Panel B & C show results
for female and male sub-sample, respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, & * Significant
at 10% level of significance.
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APPENDIX
3.A Timeline of Nepalese Civil War
1959 • New constitution establishes parliamentary democracy (a “partyless”
Panchayat system)
1990 • “People’s Movement” (Jana Andolan) ended 28 years of monarchical
rule; established panchayat system of self-government
February, 1996 • Formal announcement of the “Peoples War” by the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoist)
June, 2001 • Ten royal family members are massacred in their palace, allegedly by
Prince Dipendra
Aug–Nov, 2001 • First round of peace talks begin (3 rounds held until November, 2001)
23rd November, 2001 • Peace talks collapse
26th November, 2001 • State of Emergency is declared and Nepal Army is sent in to attack the
Maoists
January, 2003 • A second ceasefire is established and a second set of peace talks begin
Apr–Aug, 2003 • Three rounds of peace talks held
August, 2003 • Maoists withdraw from the ceasefire
September, 2005 • Maoists declare a three-month unilateral ceasefire to woo opposition
political parties
January, 2006 • Maoists decide not to extend the four-month ceasefire stating that the
government had broken the ceasefire with numerous attacks on
Maoist villages
May, 2006 • Nepal’s new cabinet declares a ceasefire. The cabinet also announces
that the Maoist rebels will no longer be considered a terrorist group.
Rebels are also encouraged to open peace talks.
November, 2006 • Peace talks end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord
between Prime Minister Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda. The
deal allows the Maoists to take part in government, and places their
weapons under UN monitoring.
Notes: As can be seen from the table above, the Maoists repeatedly withdrew ceasefire fol-
lowing multiple rounds of peace talks and these were events that were typically followed by
mass strikes of violence, unanticipated acts of violence, destruction of property etc., all as a
propaganda for the Maoist cause.
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3.B Figures
Figure 3.B.1: Village Development Committees (VDCs) & Municipalities of
Nepal (in red) that experienced some conflict-related events from 1996-2006.
Notes: Out of 3,915 Village Development Committees (VDCs), the conflict data records some
violent events for 2,427 villages.
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